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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES DEREGULATION'S CONTRIBUTION to the financial crisis that
began in the spring of 2007. We begin with the view that the financial crisis was not
an unpredictable, unforeseeable event that landed on the global economy from
nowhere. Rather, it was the all too foreseeable consequence of a series of policy
decisions made over decades that weakened a carefully constructed economic
regulatory structure designed in part to guard the U.S. economy against the
consequences of radical instability in the financial markets
While much attention has been given to a variety of gaps in the financial
regulatory system, this article looks at those gaps as only the most immediate cause
of the financial crisis. We see the financial crisis as ultimately stemming from the
effort to use finance, and in particular consumer debt, as a strategy for
counteracting the effects of stagnating incomes and increased inequality of wealth.
Consequently, this paper seeks to trace the key deregulatory decisions in three
markets-labor markets, home mortgage markets, and finally, the broader
financial markets with particular attention to the institutions involved in
constituting the secondary and tertiary markets in securities derived from home
mortgages.
Our purpose is to provide an overview of key legal developments in three
distinct areas-labor market regulation and basic individual income tax policy,
home mortgage regulation, and financial markets regulation. The underlying
1. This New Deal regulatory structure included the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (2006)) (commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act); the Securities
Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)); the Banking Act of
1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2006)); the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)); the Investment Company Act of
1940, ch. 686, 54 stat 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (2006)); and the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006)); the
Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, repealed by Public Utility Holding Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.
§ 16451, et. seq. (2005). For a history of the weakening of this structure, see ROBERT KUTTNER, THE
SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 3-15 (2007)
(providing a detailed analysis of how modern politics and economic policies in the United States led to a
nationwide decline in prosperity); and JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2003) (analyzing how the Federal Reserve, deregulation, creative
accounting, tax cuts, and private industry each had a role in the corporate scandals and financial burst that
occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s); see also Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New
Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 534-46 (2003) (explaining the role played by the Securities Act of 1933, the
Banking Act of 1933, and the Banking Act of 1935 in the New Deal).
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theory of the article is that weak labor market regulation led to stagnant real wages,
growing inequality and falling savings rates even as aggregate wealth and
productivity grew dramatically. These trends weakened consumer demand, and led
to a variety of pressures to make credit provision easier as a method of bolstering
consumer spending and protecting households from the full consequences of
stagnant wages.' As these trends intensified, financial transactions contributed a
larger and larger share of U.S. economic activity, and financial firms contributed
more and more disproportionately to overall U.S. corporate profits.' In this
environment, the political pressures for further financial deregulation were
irresistible.4
This analysis is of course necessarily incomplete. We have not chosen to address a
number of critical areas of this analysis, including the role played by trade
liberalization, the recent history of safety and soundness regulation in the banking
sector, and the complex history of state-federal interaction in regard to consumer
protection issues in financial services.' Each of these issues is quite significant, but
limitations of space and time preclude addressing them in the manner they each
deserve.
In each area we address, our purpose is to give the reader a sense of the
deregulatory direction of public policy, and some of the consequences of that
direction. Our aim is not a comprehensive history, but rather a kind of map of how
2. See generally CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, DROWNING IN DEBT: AMERICA'S MIDDLE CLASS FALLS DEEPER IN
DEBT AS INCOME GROWTH SLOWS AND COSTS CLIMB (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/
boomburden-web.pdf.
3. Financial activity, including insurance, accounted for 8.1% of the United States gross domestic
product in 2006, which represents a 40% increase since 1980. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, GROSS-
DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-BY-INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpo-action.cfm?anon=
88262&table id=23975&format-type=0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). Since 1999, financial companies regularly
provided a disproportionate share of the Standard & Poor's 500 average per-share earnings, at times nearly
doubling the share of the second highest industry group. David Gaffen, The Profit Picture Remains Ugly--After
Dismal 2008, Quick Rebound Unlikely; Will Health Care Be the Rx?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at C1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123412201560361003.html.
4. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy, 30 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 17, 19-20, 32 (2008).
5. Generally, "trade liberalization refers to a process of interstate cooperation laid down by an
international trade agreement aimed at disciplining governmental measures and practices that restrict foreign
goods' or services' access to domestic markets or impair the competitive relationship between foreign goods or
services [and] like domestic goods and services." Gabriel Gari, Legal Instruments for the Liberalization of Trade
in Services at the Sub-Regional Level: The MERCOSUR Case, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 659, 666 (2007). Several
federal administrative agencies, including the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Reserve, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Company, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency are charged with ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial institutions they regulate. 12
U.S.C. §§ 1463, 4513. For reports of recent failures of this regulatory framework, see Binyamin Appelbaum &
Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer; Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control,
Then Fail, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al; Zachary A. Goldfarb, Mixed Signals for Mortgage Giants; Despite
Exceeding Requirements, Firms Called Undercapitalized, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at D2. For a discussion of
state and federal authority over consumer protection in financial services, see generally Elizabeth R. Schlitz,
Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 893 (2008).
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the deregulatory impulse fed upon itself, and in ways that might not be
immediately obvious, made our economy and our society more dependent on
unsustainable financial practices, and more vulnerable to the inevitable
denouement that followed on the heels of the growth of those practices.
I. DEREGULATION OF LABOR MARKETS
The New Deal and World War II produced a fairly high degree of regulation in
both labor and capital markets, augmented by a progressive income tax system.6
This regulatory structure was designed to prevent the reoccurrence of the Great
Depression by ensuring stable, widespread consumer demand through regulated
labor markets, and in parallel capital market regulation aimed at meeting the de-
mand for both expensive consumer goods (homes and cars) and for business fi-
nancing with a minimum amount of instability.7
In the area of labor market regulation, the key elements were a legally established
system of private sector collective bargaining, a system of wage and hour regulation
including the minimum wage and the forty hour week, enforced by the Federal
Department of Labor, and finally, a progressive tax system.8
A. The Erosion of the Collective Bargaining System
The promotion of collective bargaining as a means of resolving labor disputes was
enshrined in law in the National Labor Relations Act.' However, the key methods
used by unions to organize new workplaces during their period of greatest
growth-the sit down strike and the secondary boycott-were outlawed by 1948."°
These developments had long-term implications for the ability of labor unions to
organize workers as economic activity shifted from region to region within the
United States, as industries changed, and finally, as the economy moved from a
predominantly industrial economy to a predominantly service sector economy.1'
6. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1192
(1986) (providing a historical analysis of how the New Deal drastically changed federal regulation).
7. See id. at 1243-44, 1246-52 (describing how the New Deal responded to the Great Depression by
allowing the federal government to regulate labor, business, and the economy).
8. The National Labor Relations Act established a system of private sector collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157-169 (2006). The Fair Labor Standards Act established wage and hour rules such as the minimum wage
and the forty hour work week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; see also Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-169 (2006).
10. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (holding that a sit-down strike was not
protected concerted activity). The Labor Management Relations Act outlawed secondary boycotts and other
forms of concerted activity. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), 187 (2006) (also known as the Taft-Hartley Act). See
generally Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Conscious-
ness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (describing how the conservative federal judiciary eviscerated
the National Labor Relations Act).
11. Jacoby, supra note 4, at 45 n.58; Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive
Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 6 (1993).
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While the National Labor Relations Act provided for union representation elec-
tions under "laboratory conditions," the lack of financial penalties for violating
these conditions created incentives for employers to create hostile environments
surrounding union representation elections in the private sector. 2 As a result,
union organizing efforts in the private sector, particularly in companies or indus-
tries with low union density, have not as a general matter been marked by success,
and the long-term trend in union membership as a percentage of the workforce has
been declining since the early 1950s."5
However, notwithstanding the slow erosion of union density, the collective bar-
gaining system remained a central feature of private sector U.S. labor relations
through the 1970s, with collective bargaining setting wages and benefits in manu-
facturing, mining, transportation, construction and certain key service sectors like
retail food workers and the entertainment industry.'4
The collective bargaining system in this period was marked by a regulatory phi-
losophy that sought to make strikes and lockouts a useable but costly tactic for both
labor and management." Among the legal doctrines deployed in pursuit of this
objective was the concept that strikers could not be fired. 6 Thus, in a strike, work-
ers would suffer a loss of income, but would not be under the pressure of losing
their jobs. 7 Statutory provisions such as the ban on secondary boycotts were de-
12. 29 U.S.C. § 159; NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (holding that where an em-
ployer has "destroy[ed] the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election," the National Labor Relations
Board has the authority to order that employer to bargain with the union); In re General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) ("[It is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employ-
ees."); see also COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, DUNLOP COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS-FINAL REPORT 38-39, 42 (1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.
edu/keyworkplace/2 [hereinafter DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT] (describing the contentious nature of representa-
tion elections and the inadequacy of penalties under the National Labor Relations Act).
13. DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY app. A at 57 (1970)
(citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor
Unions in the United States 1967, Bull. No. 1596, 57 (1967)); James B. Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts
on the United States and Canada, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 463, 465 (1994) (noting that in the U.S., union membership
has been in a steady decline since 1955); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, Union Member
Summary (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm. See Appendix A, infra,
to see a graphical representation of the decline of private sector union density.
14. See Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers (EPI Briefing Paper No. 143,
Aug. 2003), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/briefingpapersbpl43/ (explaining how collec-
tive bargaining within an industry benefits all workers in the same industry, even if they are not members of a
collective bargaining unit).
15. See generally Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate For Collective Bargain-
ing, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 330-33 (1998) (explaining the compromise between labor and management imposed
by the collective bargaining system).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158, 163 (2000); see Matthew T. Golden, Comment, On Replacing the Replacement
Worker Doctrine, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 51, 65 (1991) (describing the special status that strikers main-
tain while on strike).
17. Golden, supra note 16, at 62-65.
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signed to ensure that, similarly, during a strike an employer could function at a
minimal level and would not be unable to do business at all. 18
However, from early in the history of the National Labor Relations Act, courts
found that, while an employer could not fire an employee for striking, an employer
can "permanently replace" striking employees, in which case a returning striker will
have to wait until there is turnover in the replacement workforce before he or she
can return to work.19 This legal doctrine was rarely used, however, until the Air
Traffic Controllers Strike of 1981 when, in a different legal context, President Ron-
ald Reagan fired striking federal air traffic controllers." This event legitimized the
use by private sector employers of permanent replacements, which were used in
strikes in a wide range of industries.21
In addition, during the Reagan and first Bush administrations the National La-
bor Relations Board refrained almost entirely from using the powers it did have to
address employer interference with workers' rights under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act." This was the period when the National Labor Relations Board ceased
almost entirely issuing injunctions to address severe cases of employer coercion or
18. BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 13, at 229-35; RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do
UNIONS Do? 218-20 (1984); see also 93 CONG. REC. 5036, 5038 (1947); 93 CONG. REC. 3521, 3542 (1947).
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
20. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks and a Question-And-Answer Session with Reporters on the Air
Traffic Controllers Strike (Aug. 3, 1981) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=44138&st=&stl=).
21. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 440-41 (2002); James J. Brudney, To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 Wis. L. REV.
65, 71 (reviewing JuLIus GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND PERMANENT
REPLACEMENTS (1998)) (stating that "[slince 1980, employers have substantially increased their resort to per-
manent replacements during economic strikes" and that "a new generation of corporate managers regarded
[Reagan's action] ... as an invitation to pursue more aggressive responses to lawful strikes"); Jennifer Gordon,
Law, Lawyers and Labor: The United Farm Workers' Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in
Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 64 (2005) (describing the permanent replacement
doctrine and noting that since the Reagan air traffic controller event, "permanent replacement of strikers has
become a routine occurrence"); Daniel M. Katz, Louise P. Zanar, & Erica J. Dominitz, A Commentary on
Professor Morris's Comparison of Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA and RLA, 3 EMPL. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 305, 311-12 (1999) (discussing President Reagan's dismissal of the striking federal employees and
how "[ilt has now become socially acceptable among many private-sector employers to view unions as akin to
weeds, to be rooted out and destroyed"); see also Louis Uchitelle, Ousting Strikers A Costly Tactic, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1992, at D2.
22. C. John Cicero, TNS, Inc.-The National Labor Relations Board's Failed Vision of Worker Self-Help to
Escape Longterm Health Threats from Workplace Carcinogens and Toxins, 24 STETSON L. REV. 19, 68 & n.252
(1994) (noting that political considerations influence and shape regulatory policy to reflect the philosophy and
values of those in power). Both the Reagan and Bush administrations made pro-management appointments to
the NLRB and fostered an anti-worker climate, resulting in Board decisions that were considered "politically
motivated exercise[s] in bureaucratic discretion." Id. at 68 n.252; see also Posting of Ellen Dannin to Working
Life, http://www.workinglife.orgblogs/view-post.php?contentid= 11524 (Jan. 27, 2009) (stating that prior to
the Reagan administration, decisions by the National Labor Relations Board upheld the legitimacy and value of
unions, but Reagan appointed members of the Board to destroy unions and the NLRA, which continued under
Bush).
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election interference, and in which the delays associated with petitions to hold
union representation elections began to lengthen.23
The cumulative impact of the weakening of labor law was the gradual diminish-
ment of private sector collective bargaining in U.S. labor markets. 4 While private
sector union density had never been over 50% on a national basis, at one time
because of high union density in core sectors of the post-war economy like auto,
steel, and trucking, collective bargaining agreements set the standard in private
sector labor markets as a whole.2" As the private sector collective bargaining system
eroded in the 1980s and 1990s, that standard setting role diminished.
The result was the decoupling of wages and productivity. Just as technology
driven productivity began to grow in the 1980s, workers' ability to increase wages
in proportion, as predicted by neo-classical economic models, diminished. 6
But the decoupling of wages and productivity was not the only labor market
effect of the decline of collective bargaining. The private sector pension system,
which had come into being after World War II, began to decline after 1980, first
slowly and then more precipitously in tandem with the decline of the private sector
labor movement.27 As the pension system declined, so did personal savings, and as
personal savings declined, the percentage of GDP devoted to current consumption
rose.28
23. William B. Gould IV, The NLRB at Age 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the Bush II
Aftermath, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 309, 316 (2005). "Section 10(j) [of the National Labor Relations Act]
allows the Board, in its discretion, to obtain injunctive relief against a wide variety of unfair labor practices." Id.
"In 1992, under the Bush I Board the number of section 10(j) authorizations had declined to twenty-six, the
lowest since the Ford Administration in 1976." Id.; see also Andrew Strom, Rethinking the NLRB's Approach to
Union Recognition Agreements, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 50, 51 n.3 (1994) (noting that in FY 1990, the
median length of time between the filing of a representation petition and issuance of a Board decision was 314
days). See generally DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 12, at 39, 72-73 ("Representation elections should be
held before rather than after legal hearings about issues such as the scope of the bargaining unit. The elections
should be conducted as promptly as administratively feasible, typically within two weeks.").
24. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983) (noting a steady decline in "the fraction of the work force actually engaged in
collective bargaining"); see also id. at 1771 & n.4 ("Private sector union density declined from over 38% in 1954
to 24% in 1978."). According to Professor Weiler, the perception was that "American labor law ... failed to
make good on its promise to employees that they [were] free to embrace collective bargaining. . . ." Id. at 1770.
25. See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (reporting that within highly unionized industries, collective bargaining
standardized wage and benefit levels).
26. Testimony Before the H. Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, Appropriations
Comm., l10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lawrence Mishel, President, Economy Policy Institute), available at
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures-viewpoints-living-standardsand ed testimony; JARED BERN-
STEIN & LAWRENCE MISHEL, ECON. POLICY INST., WAGES GAIN GROUND: WORKFORCE BENEFITS IN 1998 FROM
TIGHTER LABOR MARKETS, HIGHER MINIMUM WAGE (1999), available at http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/
issuebriefs ib 129.
27. See generally Patrick W. Seburn, Evolution of Employer-Provided Defined Benefit Pensions, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Dec. 1991, at 16 (discussing the history of the U.S. private sector pension system). See Appendix C,
infra, for a comparison of union density and pension coverage.
28. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
PRIVATE DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 2 (2008), available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/ib-8-18.pdf; Ste-
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Despite a more activist National Labor Relations Board in the Clinton Adminis-
tration, the fundamental weakening of the legal structures protecting collective bar-
gaining that had occurred in the 1970s and 1980s was not reversed. 9 Under the
administration of George W. Bush, further weakening of the legal framework pro-
tecting collective bargaining occurred, as the National Labor Relations Board and
the federal courts took away the protections of the National Labor Relations Act
from undocumented workers and from broad groups of workers whose job de-
scriptions included incidental involvement in low level management decisions." At
the same time the National Labor Relations Board reverted to the lack of enforce-
ment and delays in enforcement of the labor laws that had been characteristic of
the Reagan administration and the administration of George H.W. Bush."
B. Wage and Hour Laws
While collective bargaining in its heyday covered large sections of the private sector
workforce, it was paired in the New Deal labor market regulatory system with a
wage and hour regulatory system designed to apply to almost all workers. 2 This
phen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security,
Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 960 (2007) (citing a study by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis that reported a precipitous fall in personal savings rate from 10.8% in 1984 to 4.8% in 1994 and 1.8%
in 2004); The U.S. economy has become a borrowing economy as "consumer debt grew approximately twice as
fast as personal income." Befort, supra, at 960-61 ("[Slavings account credits are giving way to credit card and
home equity loan debits."). For additional raw data see Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and
Product Accounts Table, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Table
View.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3PIace=N&3Pace=N&FrmView=YES&Freq=
Year&FirstYear=1947&LastYear=2008&3Place=N&Update=update&JavaBox=no#Mid (last visited Mar. 1,
2009); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 2006 EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SURVEY, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet;jsessionid=fO30f7I48daeK$09$3F$ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
29. Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 580-82 (2008) (noting that "many of the key decisions issued
by the ... Clinton Board, which had endeavored to update the law by affording greater protections to workers
in an evolving economy," were quickly overruled by courts or the Bush Board).
30. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002) (holding that undocumented
workers are not entitled to back-pay awards under the NLRA); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S.
706, 713, 722 (2001) (holding that nurses who exercise professional judgment while caring for patients are not
protected by the NLRA). For NLRB's interpretation of Kentucky River Community Care, see Croft Metals, Inc.,
348 N.L.R.B. 717, 721 (2006), Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 728-31 (2006), and Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006).
31. See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 91-92 (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2000/08/01/unfair-advantage-workers-freedom-association-united-states-under-internationa-hu (discussing
several examples of studies documenting the increase in workers' rights violations in the 1970s and 1980s, and
noting that a 1994 report "documented one hundred recent cases of flagrant workers' rights violations by
employers and the failure of U.S. labor law enforcement authorities to remedy the violations"). See generally,
Liebman, supra note 29; AFL-CIO, THE SILENT WAR: THE ASSAULT ON WORKERS' FREEDOM TO CHOOSE A
UNION AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY IN THE UNITED STATES (2005), available at http://www.aflcio.org/joinau-
nion/how/upload/vatw_issuebrief.pdf.
32. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1988)) (requiring, inter alia, that employers must pay their employees no less than the statutory
minimum wage and time-and-a-half compensation for overtime); Marion G. Crain, Afterword: The American
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system's purpose was to establish a labor market floor both to protect the poorest
workers whom the minimum wage would apply to, and to create a context that
would enhance the bargaining power of workers throughout the economy."
However, as in the case of the collective bargaining system, starting in 1980 the
wage and hour regime was weakened. 4 This was done in two simple ways. First, the
minimum wage was allowed to stagnate during periods of significant inflation and
for years thereafter.35 While raising the minimum wage has been a staple political
fight for Democratic politicians for decades, the result has nonetheless been mini-
mum wage levels that have not kept pace with inflation.36
Both the minimum wage and the rules governing the forty hour work week are
enforced primarily by the federal Department of Labor, though the states may im-
pose higher minimum wage laws and may engage in their own enforcement
activity.3
In 1980, the Department of Labor budget was $29,724,002,000 ($77,665,859,241
[2008 dollars]), representing 1.07% of GDP and $277.95 ($726.26 [2008 dollars])
per member of the workforce." In 2000 the Department of Labor budget was
Romance with Autonomy, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 187, 190 n.6 (2006) ("The New Deal policies of the mid-
1900s were designed to reduce wage competition so that American workers would enjoy higher wages and
more secure employment, increasing consumption and stimulating business growth. The core of the New Deal
was the commitment to labor unionism as a vehicle for worker representation and collective bargaining as a
means to establish the terms of employment at the industry and local level. The labor laws ... shored up the
rights of nonunion workers and simultaneously provided a minimum threshold from which unions might
bargain." (internal citations omitted)).
33. See Crain, supra note 32, at 190 n.6.
34. See Daniel Gross, Income Inequality, Writ Larger, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, § 3, at 7 (reporting that
weakened unions, cuts in marginal income tax rates, and the inability of minimum wage to keep pace with
inflation reduced workers' bargaining power); see also Robert Pear, Clinton Will Seek Spending to Curb Aliens,
Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, § 1, at 1 (reporting that the Clinton administration intended to reverse a
decline in enforcement of wage and hour laws under prior administrations).
35. See Brett Theodos & Robert Bednarzik, Earnings Mobility and Low-Wage Workers in the United States,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 2006, at 34, 34, 35 (noting that while corporate profits and real average wages have
increased with productivity since 1990, minimum wage remained virtually unchanged).
36. Liana Fox, Minimum Wage Increasingly Lags Poverty Line, ECON. POL'Y INST., Jan. 31, 2007, http://
www.epi.org/economic-snapshots/entry/webfeaturessnapshots_20070131/ ("The minimum wage is at its low-
est real value in over 50 years.... As the basic income required to support a family has grown with inflation,
the minimum wage has not kept pace with the rising costs of goods." (footnote omitted)); LAWRENCE MISHEL,
ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2OO8/2009, fig.3AA (forthcoming Mar. 2009), available at http://
www.stateofworkingamerica.org/tabfig/2008/03/SWA08_Wages-Figure.3AA.pdf; see Frank W. Munger, Social
Citizen as "Guest Worker": A Comment on Identities of Immigrants and the Working Poor, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
665, 668 (2004) (noting that minimum wage has not kept up with inflation since the mid-1970s); see also
Robert J. Gordon & Ian Dew-Becker, Controversies About the Rise of American Inequality: A Survey 16 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13982, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13982.pdfnew window=l. See Appendix E, infra, for real dollar value of the minimum wage since 1960.
37. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2006); see Theodos & Bednarzik, supra note
35, at 35 ("To date, 18 States and the District of Columbia have established minimum wages above the federally
mandated level.").
38. The United States Budget for Fiscal Year 1982, at 476, available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publica-
tions/usbudget/page/I 1386/2558/download/11386.pdf; Authors' calculations made assuming a $2.7895 trillion
GDP and a total civilian labor force of 106,940,000. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, NATIONAL INCOME
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$31,354,100,000 ($39,202,275,227 [2008 dollars]), representing .32% of GDP and
$219.90 ($274.94 [2008 dollars]) per member of the workforce. 9 In 2008 the De-
partment of Labor budget authority was $50,400,000,000, representing .35% of
GDP and $326.66 per member of the workforce. 4' This represents a nominal in-
crease in per-workforce-member spending. However, adjusting for inflation
reveals a 35% decrease in the Department of Labor Budget and a 55% decrease in
per-workforce-member spending between 1980 and 2008. 4"
In 1980, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division employed 1046
investigators.42 In 2000, at the end of the Clinton administration, the Wage and
Hour Division's budget was $147.2 million and the Division employed 949 investi-
gators. 43 Finally, in 2008, the budget was $187.1 million and the Department em-
ployed 750 investigators. 44 During this period, the workforce grew from less than
107 million to over 154 million people. 5 As a result, even after eight years of the
Clinton administration, the enforcement capacity never even approached the levels
of the 1970s.46
AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLE: TABLE 1.1.5. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (20o9), http://www.bea.gov/national/
nipaweb/TableView.asp?SeectedTabe=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView
=YES&Freq=YEar&FirstYear= 1979&LastYear=2008&3Place=N&Update=UPdate&JavaBox=no#Mid; Household
Data Annual Averages, EMp. & EARNINGS (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wash., D.C.) Jan. 2009, at 193-94, availa-
ble at http'" ,vww.bls.gov/cps/cpsaati.pdf.
39. United States Department of Labor Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2002, available at http://
www.dol.gov/-sec/Budget2002/budgetfy2002-txt.htm. Authors' calculations made assuming a $9.817 trillion
GDP and a total civilian labor force of 142,583,000. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 38; House-
hold Data Annual Averages, supra note 38, at 193-94.
40. United States Department of Labor Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2008, available at https://
www.dol.gov/-sec/Budget2008/overview.htm; Authors' calculations made assuming a $14.2646 trillion GDP
and a total civilian labor force of 154,287,000. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 38; Household
Data Annual Averages, supra note 38, at 193-94.
41. Inflation adjustment calculated by authors, using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index
Inflation Calculator Formula, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
42. BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS BY AGENCY (1982); David J. Walsh,
The FLSA Comp Time Controversy: Fostering Flexibility or Diminishing Worker Rights?, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 74, 106 n.147 (1999).
43. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, 1999-2000 RE-
PORT ON INITIATIVES 3 (2000), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/a5cOOe8d7415a905dd-o4m6ikkkt.pdf; U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Employment Standards Administration: Overview, http://www.dol.gov/-sec/budget/esa2000l.
htm#content (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (indicating that in FY 2000, the Wage and Hour Division made a
budget request for $147.2 million).
44. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, FISCAL YEAR 20o8 BUDGET OVERVIEW, https://www.dol.gov/_sec/
Budget2008/overview.htm#esa (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (reporting that the Wage and Hour Division's budget
request for FY 2008 was $187.1 million, with 1,336 full-time employees or FTE); Is the Department of Labor
Effectively Enforcing Our Wage and Hour Laws?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, 110th
Cong. 5 (2008) (testimony of Kim Bobo), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-07-15-
KimBobo.pdf.
45. Household Data Annual Averages, supra note 38, at 193-94.
46. Edward Montgomery, Department of Labor: Promoting Opportunity While Protecting Worker Rights, in
CHANGE FOR AMERICA: A PROGRESSIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENT 178-79 (Mark Green & Michele
John eds., 2008).
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One significant force counterbalancing the weakening of administrative enforce-
ment of wage and hour rules was the growing level of private enforcement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and its state law equivalents, particularly around overtime
rules.47 The growth in these cases began in the early 1990s with the Nordstrom
overtime cases, and proliferated particularly in the retail sector in the 1990s. 48 Wal-
Mart has been the defendant in a number of these cases 9.4  These cases generally
center on the refusal of employers to consider incidental worktime such as time to
change into mandatory uniforms as worktime 5 However, the economics of this
type of litigation has tended to confine it to large workforces5 1 It is less clear that
this type of litigation has been broadly effective in enforcing the wage and hour
laws in the large parts of the economy characterized by small firms such as con-
struction and restaurants.52
A further development that has weakened both the wage and hour regulatory
system and the collective bargaining system has been the growth in employment
relationships that employers have succeeded in classifying as independent contrac-
47. See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor's Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 385-86 (2008).
48. Isadore Barmash, Unusual Setbacks For Nordstrom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at D12, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/hillpage.html?res=9CCE6DF1 731 F934AI 5750C0A966958260; Nordstrom Set to
Resolve Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at D2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9FOCE2D6133EF931A25752COA965958260; Settlement Approved in Nordstrom Back Pay Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1993, at D4, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FOCE3DA163BF930A25757
COA965958260. For a discussion of this trend, see Ruckelshaus, supra note 47.
49. See, e.g., Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 220 Fed. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2007); In re Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2005); In re Wage Payment Litig., 759 A.2d 217 (Me. 2000); Lopez v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 865 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Yates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo.
1999); Basinger v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22167 (D. Me. 1999). In 2008, Wal-Mart
announced the settlement of 63 wage and hour class action lawsuits that were pending in federal and state
courts in 42 states for approximately $640 million. See Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart and Plaintiffs' Coun-
sel Announce Settlement of Most Wage and Hour Class Action Lawsuits Against the Company (Dec. 23, 2008)
(available at http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/8867.aspx).
50. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005). In IBP, a class of poultry plant employees alleged that the
time spent changing in and out of protective clothing on the employer's premises was compensable time under
the FLSA. Id. at 24. IBP, a large producer of beef and pork products, required all workers to don protective
garments prior to each shift and expected workers to clock out before they "doffed" or removed the garments at
the end of each shift. Id. at 30-31. The Supreme Court determined that the protective clothing was "integral
and indispensable" to a "principal activity" of the employees' work, thus time spent donning and doffing the
protective clothing was covered by the FLSA. Id. at 37.
51. Most wage and hour law claims are uneconomic for plaintiffs to pursue individually because the costs
of litigation greatly exceed the potential recovery. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)
(discussing how class action litigation permits "plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to
litigate individually").
52. "The restaurant industry employs an estimated 13 million people, or 9% of the U.S. workforce." NA-
TIONAL RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 2009 RESTAURANT INDUSTRY POCKET FACTBOOK (2009), available at http://
www.restaurant.org/pdfs/research/2009Factbook.pdf; see also Ruckelshaus, supra note 47, at 387 (noting that
"the actual amounts recovered in low-wage cases are often insufficient to tempt private attorneys to undertake
the case" because an "individual worker would have to continue to make periodic fee payments, pay for discov-
ery, preliminary discovery motions, and any substantive legal motions filed by either side"). However, bringing
a class action lawsuit may be difficult for employees of small firms because such lawsuits require that "member-
ship of the class be so numerous as to make it impracticable for the plaintiff to bring all before the court."
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1959); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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tor relationships. s3 These types of relationships have become prevalent in areas of
the economy as diverse and significant as home health care, software development,
and trucking. 4 The growth of independent contractor arrangements that actually
have the economic and sociological content of a conventional employer-employee
relationship is difficult to tease out of statistics regarding the growth of self-em-
ployment, but this phenomenon is clearly a contributor to the erosion of labor
market regulation."
C. The Decline of the Progressive Tax System
Tax policy as a broad subject matter is often omitted in discussions of labor market
regulation. 6 However, tax policy is relevant to our discussion in several ways. First,
53. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 47, at 378, 380-83 ("In independent contractor schemes, firms argue they
are off-the-hook for any violations of rules protecting 'employees.'"). The GAO estimates that 10.3 million
independent contractors were employed in 2005, and "the number of independent contractors in the total
employed workforce grew from 6.7 percent in 1995 to 7.4 percent in 2005." Employee Misclassification: Im-
proved Outreach Could Help Ensure Proper Worker Classification Before the Subcomm. on Income Security and
Family Support and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measure of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. 2
(2007) (statement of Sigurd R. Nilsen, Director Education, Workforce, and Income Security), available at http:I
/www.gao.govlnew.items/d07859t.pdf.
54. Lawsuits often involve independent contractors working within those very areas of the economy. See,
e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Microsoft misclassified
employees as "independent contractors" to deny them company pension benefits), rev'd on other grounds, 120
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997); Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that the State of California paid "chore workers" under California's in-home supportive services
program less than the federal minimum wage in violation of the FLSA); Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Hope to
Lure FedEx Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A12 (discussing FedEx's efforts to prevent truck drivers
classified as "independent contractors" from unionizing); see also Ruckelshaus, supra note 47, at 381-82 ("Inde-
pendent contractor misclassification occurs with an alarming frequency in construction, day labor, janitorial
and building services, home health care, child care, agriculture, poultry and meat processing, high-tech, deliv-
ery, trucking, home-based work, and the public sectors." (footnotes omitted)).
55. The growth of independent contractor arrangements has enabled employers to opt out of core labor
market regulation by misclassifying employees as independent contractors. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 47, at
373, 374-75, 381. See generally Mark H. Grunewald, Introduction, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725, 727 (1995)
(discussing the growth of contingent employment in the job market and the need for proper classification of
independent contractors). When employers misclassify employees as independent contractors, employees are
excluded from coverage from key state and federal laws designed to protect workers such as: minimum wage
and overtime premium pay, family and medical leave, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, Social
Security, and Medicare. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 47, at 381. Moreover, misclassification of employees as
independent contractors has negatively affected the administration of state worker compensation and unem-
ployment insurance programs. See FISCAL POLICY INST., NEW YORK STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION: How
BIG IS THE COVERAGE SHORTFALL? 2 (2007), available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/publications2007/FPI-
WorkersCompShortfallWithAddendum.pdf (estimating that misclassification of workers amounts to a loss of
$500 million to $1 billion annually in evaded workers' compensation premium); MICHAEL P. KELSAY ET AL.,
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 6, 7 (2006), available at
http://www.faircontracting.org/NAFCnewsite/prevailingwage/pdf/llinois-Misclassification Study.pdf (estimat-
ing that misclassification of workers in 2005 resulted in a $53.7 million loss of unemployment insurance taxes
and misclassification of workers in 2004 amounted to a $97.9 million loss in workers' compensation
premiums).
56. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2001, 2076 (1996) (noting that tax policy played no role in the Family and Medical Leave Act).
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the dismantling of progressive tax structures since the 1970s has weakened the abil-
ity of the United States to fund the types of public goods that can drive sustained
productivity increases-i.e. improved public schools, high speed internet, and a
modernized, energy efficient transportation infrastructure.57 In the absence of these
investments, asset bubbles appear to be an alternative approach to sustaining rising
living standards."
Second, the declining progressivity in the tax structure has meant that the tax
structure plays less of a role in seriously counteracting economic inequality. 9 In the
late 1950s, peak marginal tax rates were over 90%.' By 1992, those rates, while
slightly higher than they had fallen to at the end of the Reagan administration,
remained at low levels compared to the historic post-war rates.6 Of course, the
Clinton administration raised tax rates across the board, and increased progressiv-
57. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male
Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 465, 471-72 (1987). A progressive tax structure is one that imposes higher tax
liability based on a family's level of income. Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIz. L. REv.
739, 742 (1995). Thus, high income taxpayers pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than lower
income taxpayers. Id. "The economic and political consensus about progressive [taxes) began to fall apart
sometime in the 1970s." Kornhauser, supra, at 465-66. In contrast, other tax scholars argue that progressive
income taxes are beneficial to society because the federal government can raise revenues by imposing a higher
tax rate for the top 1% of income earners. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxa-
tion, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 998-1012 (2004) (arguing that the existing progressive income tax system is unfair
because it taxes the "super-rich" too lightly relative to everyone else); James R. Repetti, Introduction to the State
of Federal Income Taxation: Rates, Progressivity, and Budget Processes, 45 B.C. L. REV. 989, 991 (2004) (discuss-
ing psychological studies that "support the view that income has declining marginal utility and, therefore, the
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor can increase total welfare in a society").
58. Frederic S. Mishkin of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has described asset bubbles as
follows:
Financial history reveals the following typical chain of events: Because of either exuberant expecta-
tions about economic prospects or structural changes in financial markets, a credit boom begins,
increasing the demand for some assets and thereby raising their prices. The rise in asset values, in
turn, encourages further lending against these assets, increasing demand, and hence their prices, even
more. This feedback loop can generate a bubble, and the bubble can cause credit standards to ease as
lenders become less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on
further appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses.
Frederic S. Mishkin, Member of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, Address at the Wharton Financial
Institutes Center and Oliver Wyman Institute's Annual Financial Risk Roundtable: How Should We Respond to
Asset Price Bubbles? (May 15, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
mishkin20080515a.htm).
59. McMahon, supra note 57, at 1023-23.
60. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3; see also Daniel L. Simmons, Is it
Really Reform? A Theoretical Overview of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 151, 155-56 (summariz-
ing that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 carried a range of marginal tax rates from 21% at the bottom to
91% at the top, meaning that individuals in the top 91% income bracket had to pay 91 cents of every taxable
dollar to the U.S. Treasury).
61. Compare I.R.C. § l(a) (1954) (setting the highest marginal tax rate on individual income at 91%), and
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (passed by the Reagan administration and
setting the highest marginal tax rate on individuals at 28%), with Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-403 (1990) (passed by the George H.W. Bush administration and raising
the highest marginal tax rate on individual income at 31% by replacing the fuel taxes with 10% surtax on the
top income bracket).
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ity modestly, but they left the highest rate below 40%.62 Then, President George W.
Bush made rolling back the Clinton era tax rates a key policy goal for his first year
in office, one that he achieved.63
For most of the last one hundred years, capital gains tax rates have been lower
than the top income tax rate, creating significant tax subsidies for the wealthy
whose incomes tend to be more weighted toward capital gains.64 The Bush adminis-
tration took this to new extremes by lowering the long-term capital gains tax rate
to 15%, a rate less than that paid by even the poorest Americans, when taking
social security taxes and Medicare taxes into account.6" This set the stage for manip-
ulative conduct such as the characterization of hedge fund and private equity in-
centive fees (often referred to as "carried interest") as capital gains, allowing some
of the wealthiest people in the United States to pay outrageously low taxes on large
amounts of income compared to ordinary income tax rates paid by middle income
Americans.66
62. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (1993) (raising the marginal
tax rate from 36% to 39.6% for individuals earning incomes above $125,000).
63. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001) (providing reductions in income tax rates for individuals, significant changes to the federal estate tax,
and modified pension and individual retirement arrangement provisions).
64. Historically, the maximum individual tax rate has exceeded the maximum capital gains tax rate. See
CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAx TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND REGULAR INCOME:
HISTORICAL DATA (2004), available at http://www.ctj.orglpdf/regcg.pdf. With the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Congress reversed this long-standing government tax policy by lowering the maximum capital gains tax rate to
a level of parity with the maximum income tax rate. See John W. Lee, III, The Capital Gains "Sieve" and the
"Farce" of Progressivity 1921-1986, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (noting that the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
set both the maximum individual income rate and capital gains tax rates at 28%).
65. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 758
(2003) (reducing the maximum capital gains tax rate from 20% to 15% and the minimum capital gains from
10% to 5%); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 42
(2001) (providing for significant reductions in income tax rates from the top rate of 39.1% in 2001 to an
eventual level of 35% in 2006 and thereafter). See generally William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic
Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157 (2004) (concluding that
the Bush administration's 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were regressive, unaffordable, and poorly designed to boost
economic growth).
66. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (2008). Current tax law enables hedge fund and private equity managers who receive the industry
standard "two and twenty" (a 2% management fee and 20% profits interest) to defer tax on income derived
from their labor services by converting the income into long-term capital gains. Id. This quirk in the tax law
has allowed fund managers, some of the richest workers in the country, to pay tax on their labor income at
lower capital gains tax rates instead of higher ordinary income rates. Id. The use of "carried interests" as part of
a compensation strategy for fund managers has ignited a heated debate that has prompted the introduction of
legislation that would boost taxes on publicly traded financial partnerships. Randall Dodd, Tax Breaks for
Billionaires: Loophole for Hedge Fund Managers Costs Billions in Tax Revenue, ECON. POL'Y INST., July 24, 2007,
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/pml20/. See generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE
COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAx SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH - AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE
(2003). On one side of the debate are "tax scholars, former policymakers, legislators, and ... business execu-
tives [that] argue[ ] that carried interest is, in substance, compensation for labor and should be taxed as such."
See Note, Taxing Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 846,
846-47 (2008). This group, in essence, advocates for tax law reforms that would raise taxes on carried interest.
Id. On the other side of the debate, private equity partners and those who represent them, argue that tax law
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D. Consequences: Stagnant Real Wages, Rising Inequality, Falling Savings Rates
While proving causal connections between legal developments and economic out-
comes is treacherous, the weakening of labor market regulation over the past 30
years has been associated in time with labor market outcomes that set the stage for
the financial crisis. The past thirty years has been a period of stagnant real wages,
with the attendant consequence that increases in household consumption have had
to be based on either more intensive participation in labor markets by household
members, lower taxes or lower savings, or all three.67
Not surprisingly, stagnant wages have been associated with rising income and
asset inequality, in particular when combined with the extraordinarily regressive
tax policies of the George W. Bush administration.6"
However, less well known or understood is the decline in benefit plan coverage
that particularly results from a weakening labor movement.69 Real pension plans
are an outgrowth of a strong collective bargaining system." They are collective
reforms would create inequity, discourage investors, or otherwise harm the economy. Id. at 847. Thus far, no
politically viable resolution of the issue has yet emerged. See generally Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried
Interests: The Reform That Did Not Happen, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 210-14 (2009) (discussing failed legisla-
tive attempts to revise the term "investment services partnership interest" of § 710 to the Internal Revenue
Code to treat "carried interests" as compensation income).
67. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 24 (2007), available at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/2007-erp.pdf (discussing how rising energy costs, rising wealth, and falling un-
employment rates caused the personal saving rate to fall to negative 1% in 2006-"its lowest annual level
during the post-World War II era"). See Appendix B, infra, for a comparison of real wages and worker
productivity.
68. See JARED BERNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS OF INCOME TRENDS 3 (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/4-9-08sfp.pdf (noting that since the late 1980s,
income inequality has grown significantly due to stagnant wages for bottom and middle wage earners); see also
McMahon, supra note 57, at 998-99. See Appendix F, infra, for illustration of the growth in inequality.
69. See Craig C. Martin & Joshua Rafsky, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: An Overview of Sweeping
Changes in the Law Governing Retirement Plans, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 843, 847-50 (2007) (attributing the
decline of large unionized companies that sponsor pension plans to several factors including: (1) high adminis-
tration costs and heavy regulatory burdens, (2) employers' desire to eliminate the investment risks associated
with retirement plans, (3) the nation's shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a serviced-based econ-
omy, and (4) increased international and domestic competition in traditional industries sponsoring pension
plans); Stephen Taub, Pension Plans Disappearing, CFO.coM, June 27, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
7108045 (noting that defined benefit pension plans offered by Fortune 1000 companies are "disappearing at an
increasing pace"); Private Pension Plans, Participation, and Assets: Update, EM'. BENEFIT RES. INST., Jan. 2003,
http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfi?fa=0103fact ("The total number of private defined benefit
plans increased from 103,346 in 1975 to 175,143 in 1983.... After 1986, the number of defined benefit plans
steadily declined, to 56,405 in 1998.").
70. In the 1920s the American Federation of Labor founded its own insurance company, the Union Labor
Life Insurance Company, and in 1929 the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers established the first
multiemployer benefit plan. ULLICO, Inc., About Us, http://www.ullico.com/b/txt.cfin?page=Abo-Aboutus
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009); see also TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I'M SIXTY-FouR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS
AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 240-41 (2008); Martin & Rafsky, supra note 69, at 848.
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savings and insurance instruments.7' And as collective bargaining has declined as a
structure for labor relations, pension coverage has declined with it.
72
Finally, of course, all these developments combined to cause a steady, and ulti-
mately quite significant increase in consumer spending as a percentage of GDP.
This increase has been fed by unregulated consumer credit, provided through in-
creasingly opaque capital market structures. 74 Both developments are discussed in
the next two sections of this paper. This section has shown how labor market der-
egulation contributed to an environment of stagnating wages and endangered ben-
efits where policymakers in both parties were interested in finding ways to prop up
consumer spending in what was fast becoming a low wage economy.
7
II. DEREGULATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKETS
A. History of U.S. Mortgage Regulation
Congress passed a series of emergency acts in the early 1930s intended to prevent
the banking crisis from doing unnecessary damage to the nation's financial infra-
structure and spreading further into the real economy.76 Simultaneously, the fed-
eral government began the longer process of regulating the banking, securities and
71. See Martin & Rafsky, supra note 69, at 845 ("Pension plans are retirement savings programs provided
by employers to employees."). A traditional defined benefit plan promises retired employees periodic payments
"for the duration of the retiree's life." Id. The assets of a pension plan "are accumulated through employer
contributions and profit from investment of the plan's assets." Id.
72. Harry Arthurs, Reconciling Differences Differently: Reflections on Labor Law and Worker Voice After
Collective Bargaining, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 155, 161 (2007) (concluding that the decline of collective
bargaining agreements likely aided in the decline in pensions); Martin & Rafsky, supra note 69, at 848.
73. In 1979, consumer spending accounted for 62% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product; today, consumer
spending accounts for over 70% of GDP. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT
ACCOUNTS TABLE: TABLE 1.1.5. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2009), http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Table
View.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=no&Java=no&Request3Place=n&3Place=n&FromView=YES&Freq=
Year&FirstYear=1979&LastYear=2008&3Pace=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid. See Appendix D, infra,
for a comparison of consumer spending and union density.
74. See generally Ralph Brubaker & Kenneth N. Klee, Resolved: The 1978 Bankruptcy Code Has Been a
Success, 12 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 273, 286 (2004) (explaining that the American economy is "dependent
upon robust consumer spending that's increasingly fueled by largely unregulated consumer credit"); Programs,
Federal Pre-emption of State Usury Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 747, 780 (1982) (arguing that consumers who "do not
understand the full 'cost' of the credit they are buying ... will buy more credit than they truly want" and that
"more consumer credit [is] sold in an unregulated, imperfect market than people want").
75. See generally Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FSLA, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 59-60, 72, 88
(2001) (describing how numerous factors including "weakened unions[ I and industrial deregulation" mean
that improving a "climate of job insecurity, job instability, or stagnate wages" will be slow; how "unraveling [of
the social compact] since the late 1970s" has decreased wages and benefits for workers; and how Americans are
fixated with consumer spending).
76. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932 (RFCA) provided loans to financial institutions
as well as railroads, many of which were struggling to repay their creditors. See Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration Act of 1932, ch. 8, 47 Stat. 5, 5-7 (1932) (repealed 1947).
The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),
which charters and supervises federal S&Ls, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) to lend to S&Ls to
finance home mortgages. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725, 725, 726, 730 (1932)
(current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2000)); Fred Wright, Comment, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
DAMON SILVERS & HEATHER SLAVKIN
home mortgage markets, which would continue through the 1940 passages of the
Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act regulating mutual funds
and other pooled investment vehicles and their managers.77
Events in the housing markets in the years leading up to the Great Depression
exhibited many of the same qualities as today's markets-the real estate markets
were responsible for a disproportionate amount of economic activity, homeowner-
ship generally required either very large down payments or the willingness to take
on interest only mortgages requiring balloon payments, lenders commonly made
loans to borrowers with little regard for their abilities to repay, and speculative
borrowers and irresponsible lenders stoked a real estate bubble.7" Recognizing that
Residential Finance and Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great Depres-
sion, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 241 (2005).
The Bank Conservation Act of 1933 gave the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) authority
to appoint a conservator who could force failing banks and S&Ls into receivership. See Bank Conservation Act
of 1933, ch. 1, § 203, 48 Stat. 1, 2-3 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
The National Housing Act of 1934 provided for the creation of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) to insure deposits of S&Ls. See National Housing Act, ch. 847, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1246,
1256 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
FSLIC was administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) until it went bankrupt in 1989
and the FDIC took it over and created the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, FDIC Learning Bank: the 1930s, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/learning/when/
1930s.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Learning Bank, The 1930s].
77. The Banking Act of 1933 established the FDIC as a temporary government-sponsored company to
provide deposit insurance, regulated and supervised state banks not already under federal regulation, extended
federal oversight to all commercial banks, separated commercial and investment banking, and prohibited banks
from paying interest on checking accounts. See supra note 1; Learning Bank, The 1930s, supra note 76.
The Securities Act of 1933 instituted a disclosure regime for companies that sought to issue stocks for sale
to the general public. Id.; supra note 1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and mandated companies whose stock traded on exchanges or over the counter file regis-
tration statements in connection with their initial offerings and ongoing annual disclosures. Id.
The Banking Act of 1935 made the FDIC a permanent institution and made deposit insurance permanent.
Id. The Federal Credit Union Act of 1935 established credit union oversight, which was originally administered
by the Farm Credit Administration, but was transferred to several regulatory bodies and today responsibility
for regulating credit unions rests with the National Credit Union Administration. Id. The Trust Indenture Act
of 1939 gave the SEC responsibility for overseeing corporate issuances of debt securities. Id.
78. See Wright, supra note 76, at 232-37; see also C. LOWELL HARRiss, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE
HOME OWNERS' LOAN CORPORATION 8 (1951), available at http://www. nber.org/books/harr5l-l (discussing
the general weakness of the housing market prior to the great depression). Commentators have noted a possi-
ble outcome of market collapse:
Here is an idea of the potential impact of a total collapse of the real estate market: the real estate
mortgage debt in 1932 of $43 billion was three times that of total railroad debt; four times that of
industrial long-term debt; and nearly the same size as that of the combined federal, state, county, and
municipal debt.
Id.
When testifying before the U.S. Senate, Eric Stein, senior vice president of the Center For Responsible Lending,
observed that "[flrom 2000 through year-end 2005, median real wages grew just 1.7%, while real housing prices
grew 22%." Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis Before the Subcomm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President,
Center for Responsible Lending), available at http://www .responsiblelending.org/pdfs/senate-testimony-10-16-
08-hearing-stein-final.pdf. Furthermore, "[tihe combination of real housing price increases and flat or declin-
ing wages resulted in an unsustainable, and unstable, environment." Id.
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a speculative bubble was forming, in 1928 the Federal Reserve began tightening
monetary policy to increase interest rates and in 1929 the bubble burst as the stock
markets and economy, in general, slid into a depression. 9 Deleveraging in the fi-
nancial and housing markets led to contraction in the real economy leading to
massive layoffs, home foreclosures, corporate and personal bankruptcies, and defla-
tion, feeding into a downward spiral of further layoffs, foreclosures and
bankruptcies."0
In 1932, lenders foreclosed on more than 250,000 homes.8 ' In an attempt to
combat the foreclosure crisis, Congress passed the first piece of federal legislation
that would give the federal government a permanent role in the housing markets,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 (FHLBA)."2 FHLBA established the Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) to help provide discounted funding for new home
purchases.8 3 The FHLBs were relatively ineffective at preventing further deteriora-
tion in the housing markets because, as home prices and employment continued to
spiral out of control, even those who could afford to take on new mortgages were
hesitant to commit to long-term mortgage payments. 4
Congress passed the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 establishing the Home
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). s In a 1951 treatise on the Home Owners Loan
Corporation, C. Lowell Harris explained the economic situation leading up to its
creation:
In March 1933, millions of people faced the loss of their homes, lenders faced
heavy investment losses, communities badly in need of funds suffered from an
inability to collect property taxes, and the construction industry, which if re-
vived would contribute significantly to general economic recovery, was at a
virtual standstill.86
See also Robert J. Shiller, Infectious Exuberance, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2008, available at http://www.the
atlantic.com/doc/200807/housing (discussing the psychology of asset bubbles).
Declines in housing and stock markets lead to dramatic declines in household wealth. For example, in
2008 household net worth fell $11.2 trillion, to $51.5 trillion. See BD. OF Gov. OF THE FED. RES. SYSTEM, FLOW
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/re-
leases/z 1/Current/z 1.pdf.
79. See, e.g., David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great
Depression, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 133, 135 n.10, 137, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/08/O5/Wheelock.pdf (discussing housing market trends prior to and during the Great
Depression).
80. See Wright, supra note 76, at 232, 236, 238-40 (discussing how the real estate market collapsed during
the Great Depression leading to more foreclosures, bankruptcies and unemployment).
81. See Wheelock, supra note 79, at 570.
82. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (2000)); Wright, supra note 76, at 241.
83. See HARRISS, supra note 78, at 8.
84. Id.
85. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128, 128-29 (1933) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (2000); Wright, supra note 76, at 242.
86. See HARRISS, supra note 78, at 8-9.
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HOLC provided homeowners who were in default the opportunity to consoli-
date their housing-related obligations and refinance into low-interest mortgages.8 7
The Department of Treasury provided $200 million in financing for HOLC and
HOLC was authorized to issue up to $2 billion of tax-exempt bonds, which was
later increased to $4.75 billion, either for cash or to exchange with private lenders
for home mortgages."8 HOLC also created standard guidelines for home
appraisals.8 9
The following year Congress passed the National Housing Act of 1934, which
created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).9° In order to stimulate the
housing markets, FHA provided mortgage insurance to protect private lenders
from losses if the insured mortgage ended up in foreclosure, provided that the
loans met criteria defined by federal regulators." In order to qualify for FHA insur-
ance, the mortgage had to meet specific criteria including a 5% interest rate cap
and the loans were required to be fully amortizing, so balloon payments and inter-
est only products were prohibited." Four years later, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), was created
to finance home mortgages in the secondary market.93
As the federal government worked to address the housing finance problems that
came to a head during the Great Depression, state legislatures across the country
set out to protect homeowners from unnecessary foreclosures.94 In order to combat
the foreclosure crisis, 33 states passed legislation to protect struggling mortgage
borrowers, including 28 states that passed legislation mandating foreclosure
moratoriums.9 5 State courts often refused to hold borrowers accountable for the
balance of their defaulted mortgages after foreclosure sales failed to cover the full
amounts owed. 6
87. See Wright, supra note 76, at 242 (citations omitted).
88. See HARRISS, supra note 78, at 11.
89. See Wright, supra note 76, at 242 (citations omitted).
90. See National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.); Wright, supra note 76, at 251.
91. See Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems:
The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005). In 1965, FHA became part of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., The
Federal Housing Administration, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/ fhahistory.cfm. (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
92. See Wheelock, supra note 79, at 144.
93. See Workshop, Overcoming Discrimination in Housing, Credit, and Urban Policy, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J.
77, 92 n.22 (2006); Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml (last
visited Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae].
94. Wright, supra note 76, at 240-41 (analyzing federal and state responses to the foreclosure crisis in the
1930s).
95. See Wheelock, supra note 79, at 140 (citations omitted).
96. Wright, supra note 76, at 241 (discussing state courts in New York and Illinois that "refused to allow
deficiency judgments").
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Congress passed several pieces of federal legislation in the following decades
aimed at protecting borrowers, but generally permitted states to maintain their
primacy as enforcers of consumer protection standards. 7
B. Deregulation of Mortgage Markets
The New Deal system of housing finance lasted until the economic turmoil of the
1970s. Rising interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s put pressure on banks
and savings and loans (S&Ls), which had long been major providers of real estate
loans to U.S. borrowers.9" Banks and S&Ls were being forced to pay higher interest
rates to finance their lending activities but caps on the interest rates they were
permitted to charge borrowers made it nearly impossible to operate profitably.99
Throughout U.S. history, state usury laws capped interest rates lenders were per-
mitted to charge consumer borrowers, but that changed when Congress passed the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA), which preempted interest rate caps imposed by states.' ° By preempt-
ing state usury laws and in other ways discussed later in this article, DIDMCA
97. In 1968, as part of the Consumer Protection Act, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at scattered sections in 15 U.S.C.), to ensure that
lenders provide borrowers with meaningful disclosures that clearly define the loan terms. The Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2006), encouraged banks and S&Ls to provide
mortgages for low and moderate income borrowers and required these institutions to record their lending
practices. See Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING ASSETS BUILDING WEALTH:
CREATING WEALTH IN Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES 206 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005). The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2000), (ECOA) passed in 1974, prohibits discrimina-
tion in lending decisions. See C. Lincoln Combs, Comment, Banking Law and Regulation: Predatory Lending in
Arizona, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 617, 624 (2006). The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2908 (2006), attempted to ensure that low income and minority communities had access to credit and
deposit services. See Marcia Johnson, JaPaula Kemp & Anh Nguyen, The Community Reinvestment Act: Ex-
panding Access, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL' 89, 89 (2002-2003). Homeowner's Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA), Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.),
defines unfair and deceptive practices in mortgage lending. See Barr, supra, at 206; see also Michelle W. Lewis,
Perspectives on Predatory Lending: The Philadelphia Experience, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L.
491, 493 (2003) (noting the specific definition of predatory lending found in HOEPA).
98. EDWARD J. KANE, DEREGULATION, SECURITIES AND LOAN DIVERSIFICATION, AND THE FLOW OF HoUs-
ING FINANCE, SAVING AND LOAN ASSET MANAGEMENT UNDER DEREGULATION 80-109; San Francisco: Federal
Home Loan Bank, 1981 (Proceedings of Sixth Annual Conference).
99. See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
(2008), available at http://fdes.ots.treas.gov/482013.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). The higher interest rates in
the 1970s made competing more difficult for banks and S&L's, as they were forced to pay higher interest rates
and forced to derive their income from relatively lower yielding home mortgages while the activities of non-
banks remained unregulated. Id.; see also Grant L. Kratz, Comment, Franklin Savings v. Office of Thrift Super-
vision: A Case of Judicial Interpretation Creating a Due Process Dragon, 6 BYU I. PUB. L. 587, 587 (1992) (noting
that the inability of savings and loans to make a profit was due to the fact that the "interest rates they were
charging on long term mortgages fell short of the average cost of funds to the institution"); Carl Felsenfeld, The
Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S16-17 (1991) (explaining that the state usury laws limiting
the interest rates that S&Ls could charge to borrowers were a contributing factor to the instability of S&Ls).
100. Felsenfeld, supra note 99, at S17. Through the 1970's, usury laws "limited the interest that could be
charged on consumer real estate loans." Id. Though "ceiling rates varied from a low of six percent to a high of
twelve percent, over half of the states had ceilings of eight percent or less." Id.; see also Depository Institutions
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began the gradual erosion of regulations that both prevented systemic risk in the
financial services industry and protected consumers from predatory creditors.'
Two years later, the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982
(AMTPA) lifted restrictions on lenders' ability to offer adjustable rate mortgages.'0 2
The Act gave the primary federal banking regulators exclusive authority to regulate
the "alternative mortgage transaction[s]" undertaken by entities under their respec-
tive jurisdictions."3
According to McCoy and Renuart,
Federal deregulation permitted lenders to charge a risk premium to less
creditworthy borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and fees. Equally
importantly, deregulation allowed lenders to market new and more complex
types of mortgage products, including adjustable-rate mortgages and loans with
balloon payments and negative amortization, which expanded the pool of eligi-
ble borrowers and helped lenders control for interest-rate risk. 4
In 1982, Congress also passed the Garn-St. Germain Act, which preempted state
laws that prevented out-of-state banks from buying failed banks and thrifts. 5
Garn-St. Germain also permitted thrifts to expand their businesses beyond mort-
gage lending into commercial lending, credit cards, and real estate investing.' 6
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
101. Id.
The provisions of the constitution or the laws of any State expressly limiting the rate or amount of
interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges which may be charged, taken, received, or
reserved shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is (A) secured by a first
lien on residential real property, by a first lien on all stock allocated to a dwelling unit in a residential
cooperative housing corporation . . . or by a first lien on a residential manufactured home ....
12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(1) (2000); see also Alex M. Azar II, Note, FIRREA: Controlling Savings and Loan Associa-
tion Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L. J. 149, 153 (1990) (explaining
that the passing of DIDMCA phased out the caps on interest rates paid to depositors and allowed S&Ls to
diversify their investment portfolios).
102. 12 U.S.C §§ 3801-3806 (2000); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (2000) ("An alternative mortgage transac-
tion may be made by a housing creditor in accordance with this section, notwithstanding any State constitu-
tion, law, or regulation.").
103. 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c).
104. Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional
Home Mortgages, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REvISITED 110 (Nicolas P.
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, eds., 2008).
105. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also
Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of
Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1437, 1442 (1999); Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The
Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145, 150 n.29
(1984).
106. Terry Carter, How Lawyers Enabled the Meltdown: And How They Might Have Prevented It, 95 A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 2009, at 34, 34.
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A final stimulus for the rapid growth in mortgage lending that occurred in the
late 1980s and again in the early 2000s came from the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA). 1°7 TRA made residential mortgages unique in that the Act made interest on
home mortgages the only type of interest paid by consumers that is tax deducti-
ble.'l t This had the unintended consequence of creating an incentive for borrowers
to take out home equity lines of credit instead of using credit cards to finance
personal consumption, putting their homes at risk if they were unable to pay off
their debts. 1°9
The deregulation of the early 1980s enabled S&Ls to make risky loans to finance
real estate acquisitions."' Falling real estate and oil prices later in the decade, how-
ever, caused many of these projects to fail."' These large losses eventually pushed
so many S&Ls into bankruptcy that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC), which had provided deposit insurance to S&Ls since the 1930s,
became insolvent as well." 2
By 1989, the S&L crisis had raised legitimate concerns among policymakers
about the prudence of banking deregulation and Congress passed Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) in an effort to
107. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
108. See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Re-
sponse, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 288 (2008) (noting that as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the interest
paid on residential mortgages became the only consumer loans where the interest paid was tax deductible).
109. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (2005) (explaining
that funding expenses with mortgage debt became more attractive to consumers than funding their expenses
by credit cards and personal loans because the TRA "eliminated the federal income tax deduction of consumer
interest for all purposes except home mortgages").
[S]ubprime lending would not become a viable large-scale lending alternative until the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA). The TRA increased the demand for mortgage debt because it prohibited the
deduction of interest on consumer loans, yet allowed interest deductions on mortgages for a primary
residence as well as one additional home. This made even high-cost mortgage debt cheaper than
consumer debt for many homeowners. In environments of low and declining interest rates, such as
the late 1990s and early 2000s, cash-out refinancing becomes a popular mechanism for homeowners
to access the value of their homes. In fact, slightly over one-half of subprime loan originations have
been for cash-out refinancing.
Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88
FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 31, 38 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
110. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Learning Bank: The 1980s, http://www.fdic.gov/about/
learn/learning/when/1980s.html (last visited February 23, 2009) [hereinafter Learning Bank, The 1980s].
Ill. Roger D. Citron, Lessons from the Damages Decisions Following United States v. Winstar Corp., 32 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (noting that the decline experienced by the real estate business in the late 1980s was
subsequent to the fall in oil and commercial real estate prices).
112. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT, ASSESSING TREASURY'S STRATEGY: Six
MONTHS OF TARP 44-50 (Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing events leading up to the Savings & Loan crisis and govern-
ment responses implemented to resolve the crisis); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 846-47 (1996)
(noting that the failed savings and loans confronted FSLIC with deposit insurance liabilities, leading the corpo-
ration to become insolvent by over $50 billion by 1998); Richard Wei, Note, United States v. Winstar: Renewed
Government Liability Arising from the Savings and Loans Crisis, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 366, 368 (1997); Learning
Bank, The 1980s, supra note 110.
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reregulate the industry."1 3 The main purpose of FIRREA was to strengthen regula-
tion of S&Ls and to enhance regulators' enforcement powers." 4
C. Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws
FIRREA created the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and gave it "the plenary and
exclusive authority . . . to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal
[S&Ls]." l As a result, OTS regulations are "preemptive of any state law purporting
to address the subject of the operations of a Federal savings association."' l 6 This
authority allows the OTS to preempt state laws and regulate "the powers and opera-
tions of every Federal [S&L] from its cradle to its corporate grave.""'
OTS regulations generally preempt state regulations and enforcement actions
unless they only "incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal [S&Ls]."
But the federal regulators were often slow to implement consumer protections and
their enforcement was generally weak, compared to the state laws they pre-
empted." 9 For example, the Federal Reserve waited until the end of 2001 to imple-
ment regulations under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA) that created substantive limitations on the types of loans that could be
sold to consumers. 2 ' This was after a nearly 400% increase in the volume of sub-
prime loans. 121 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board waited until 2008, in the midst
113. FDIC, The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, in HISTORY OF THE
8os-LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 3, 10 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/databanklhist80.
114. Id.
115. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2007).
116. Id.
117. Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982) (quoting People v. Coast Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1952)).
118. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c) (2007).
119. See Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to Solving the Problem of
Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 451-52 (2005) (comparing the weak enforcement
provisions in federal lending statutes to state anti-predatory lending statutes, which generally include the fol-
lowing comprehensive provisions: "limiting the interest rates and fees that a lender may charge; precluding
lending to borrowers without regard to their ability to repay; requiring refinance loans to provide a net tangible
financial benefit to the borrower; prohibiting excessive prepayment penalties; requiring disclosure to the bor-
rower of various loan provisions; and requiring counseling for borrowers who are planning to take out certain
loans that are governed by these laws"). More recently, Chairman Bernanke has said the Board would "consider
whether other lending practices meet the legal definition of unfair and deceptive and thus should be prohibited
under HOEPA." Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Address at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 17,
2007), available at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007O5l7a.htm. In 2008, nearly 20
years after FIRREA's preemption of state laws regulating S&Ls, that the Federal Reserve published final rules
that applied key protections for consumers to amend federal regulations. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
120. See Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,605 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226);
see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, TRUTH IN LENDING: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 2
(2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/tiI.pdf.
121. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE
AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING
CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY 36 n.63 (2009).
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of the subprime mortgage crisis, to implement changes to the regulations under the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) "to protect consumers in the mortgage market from
unfair, abusive, or deceptive lending and servicing practices" and "ensure that ad-
vertisements for mortgage loans provide accurate and balanced information and do
"1122not contain misleading or deceptive representations ....
DIDMCA and AMTPA, together with the courts' interpretations that these acts
overrode the application of most state consumer protections and the federal regula-
tors' general reluctance to implement and enforce consumer protection regulations
were a lethal combination.'23 These factors paved the way for risky, and often pred-
atory, mortgage lending standards to replace more responsible practices.'24
There is a general perception that predatory lending practices have been concen-
trated in the non-banking institutions that are not regulated by state or federal
banking regulators. 2 1 However, the data suggests the problem may be a combina-
tion of a lack of regulatory coverage with weak federal regulators.2 6 In 2005, 52%
of subprime mortgages were originated by companies that were subject to some
federal regulation.'27 Financial institutions including Citigroup and HSBC, two of
the largest consumer lending institutions regulated at the federal level, have been
forced to pay large penalties to settle predatory lending allegations against their
subsidiaries.2
122. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (Jan. 9, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
The final rule applies four protections to a newly defined category of higher-priced mortgage loans
secured by a consumer's principal dwelling, including a prohibition on lending based on the collat-
eral without regard to consumers' ability to repay their obligations from income, or from other
sources besides the collateral. The revisions apply two new protections to mortgage loans secured by
a consumer's principal dwelling regardless of loan price, including a prohibition on abusive servicing
practices. The Board is also finalizing rules requiring that advertisements provide accurate and bal-
anced information, in a clear and conspicuous manner, about rates, monthly payments, and other
loan features. The advertising rules ban several deceptive or misleading advertising practices, includ-
ing representations that a rate or payment is 'fixed' when it can change. Finally, the revisions require
creditors to provide consumers with transaction-specific mortgage loan disclosures within three bus-
iness days after application and before they pay any fee except a reasonable fee for reviewing credit
history.
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226).
123. See Sally Pittman, Arms, But No Legs to Stand On: "Subprime" Solutions Plague the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1089, 1093-96 (2008); Jon Birger, How Congress Helped Create the Subprime Mess,
FORTUNE, Jan. 31, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/30/reaLestate/congress--subprime.fortune/ (pointing
the AMTPA and DIDMCA as the "root of the current mortgage crisis").
124. See Birger, supra note 123; Pittman, supra note 123, at 1093-96.
125. See Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Lending Oversight: Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 22, 2007, at A1 ("Changes in the lending business and financial markets have moved large swaths of




128. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents:
Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 515, 522 (2007).
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D. GSEs-Privatizing Public Institutions
After Fannie Mae was founded in 1938, its success in providing liquidity to the
mortgage markets led the government to create additional government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) to provide mortgage financing, including Ginnie Mae and Fred-
die Mac.'29 Fannie Mae operated as a government agency during its first 30 years
and was only permitted to purchase FHA-insured mortgages. 3 ° In 1968, Fannie
Mae was split into two separate entities-Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae.'' Ginnie
Mae remained a government agency and was directed to provide mortgage financ-
ing for special government projects.'32 Fannie Mae, however, became a "govern-
ment-sponsored private corporation", owned by public stockholders and run like a
public company.'33 The 1968 Charter Act transformed Fannie Mae into a profit-
seeking, shareholder owned company, tasked with creating a secondary market for
mortgages made to low- and moderate-income borrowers.'34
In order to create a secondary market for conventional mortgage, Congress
passed the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, which both expanded Fannie
Mae's authority to operate in the conventional mortgage markets and created an-
other GSE, Freddie Mac, to serve this purpose. 3 ' The modern securitization market
was developed in the 1970s to allow Freddie Mac access to larger amounts capital to
finance home mortgages.'36 The other GSEs and private lenders began securitizing
mortgages in the 1980s. 37 By 1993, 60% of newly originated home mortgage were
securitized. 13
129. See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93. Fannie Mae was created in 1938 and was adminis-
tered by FHA "to purchase, hold, or sell FHA-insured mortgage loans that had been originated by private
lenders." Id. After World War II, Fannie Mae expanded to provide mortgage loans for veterans. Id. In 1968,
Fannie Mae was split into two entities, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and
Fannie Mae. Id. Ginnie Mae remained under government control and was operated with the explicit purpose of
providing mortgages to underserved communities and Fannie Mae became a private organization and was
authorized to issue mortgage backed securities to finance its activities in the secondary mortgage markets. Id.
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was created by the Emergency Home Finance
Act of 1970 to finance conventional mortgages in the secondary markets. Id.
130. FANNIE MAE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FANNIE MAE 3 (2008), available at http://www.fanniemae.con/
media/pdf/fannie mae_introduction.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, INTRODUCTION] ("At first, Fannie Mae, as a
government agency, was authorized to only buy Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured mortgages,
thereby replenishing the supply of lendable money for these government-backed loans.").
131. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2006); Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93.
132. 12 U.S.C. § 1717; Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93 ("Ginnie Mae would continue as a
federal agency and be responsible for the then-existing special assistance programs ... .
133. Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93.
134. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1717; Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93.
135. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 303, 305, 84 Stat. 450 (1970); see also
Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, supra note 93.
136. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1273 (2002).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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In 1992, the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act
transferred regulatory responsibility for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 12 Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO).' 9 OFHEO was responsible for overseeing the safety and soundness of
the GSEs and the Act directed OFHEO to establish minimum capital requirements
and set up regular examinations.14 After OFHEO was established, HUD retained
general authority to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 4'
GSE requirements became the standard in home mortgage lending and until
2003 most mortgage originations were underwritten to conform with the require-
ments defined by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for loans that they were willing to
finance in the secondary markets.'42
The subprime crisis, however, really began when in 2004 private companies' is-
suance of mortgage-backed securities surpassed Fannie Mae's for the first time in
history with private companies issuing $809 billion and Fannie Mae issuing $537
billion. 143
The combination of the conversion of the GSEs into for-profit enterprises with
the competition they faced from deregulated competitors proved to be an irresisti-
ble temptation for the GSEs. 4 4 Although the GSEs were neither the primary actors
in the subprime fiasco nor the cause of the financial crisis, as some conservative
commentators have asserted, they did become fatally infected with the disease of
overleverage and indifference to risk in the pursuit of unsustainable returns."'
139. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1311, 106
Stat. 3941, 3944 (1992).
140. Housing Enterprises: The Roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. Housing Financing System
Before the Task Force on Housing & Infrastructure of the H. Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (state-
ment of Thomas J. McCool, Director, Financial Institutions & Markets Issues, General Government Division,
General Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ggOO182t.pdf.
141. Id.
142. John Kiff& Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S. Subprime
Mortgage Markets 6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 188, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1006316.
Fannie Mae's activities enhance the liquidity and stability of the mortgage market and contribute to
making housing in the United States more affordable and more available to low-, moderate- and
middle-income Americans. These activities include providing funds to mortgage lenders through
[the] purchases of mortgage assets, and issuing and guaranteeing mortgage-related securities that
facilitate the flow of additional funds into the mortgage market[s].
FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K), at 1 (Dec. 31, 2007).
143. FANNIE MAE, SINGLE FAMILY GUARANTY BUSINESS: FACING STRATEGIC CROSSROADS 23 (2005) [here-
inafter STRATEGIC CROSSROADS], available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081209103003.pdf.
144. See Paul Krugman, Fannie, Freddie and You, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2008, at A21, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14krugman.html?-r=1&scp=3&sq=fannie%20mae&st=Search (ex-
plaining that, while the GSEs did not maintain a sufficient capital base, they did not originate subprime mort-
gages); James R. Hagerty, U.S. News: U.S. Rethinks Roles of Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2008, at A5
(noting that the GSE's were conflicted between a desire to gain maximum profits and the reality of their
responsibilities to the housing industry).
145. See Krugman, supra note 144; Michael S. Barr & Gene Sperling, Poor Homeowners, Good Loans, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A23 (explaining that conservatives have blamed Democrats' efforts to promote low-
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A 2005 presentation prepared by Fannie Mae former CEO Daniel Mudd raised
alarms that Wall Street firms were moving into its market and flagged Lehman
Brothers and Bear Stearns as new competitors.'46 Mudd's presentation outlined the
decision Fannie Mae faced to either maintain its business focus on safe, prime
mortgages or move into the risky subprime market to increase profits and maintain
its competitive edge.'47
According to a 2008 written statement from Congressman Henry Waxman, then
chair of the House Oversight Committee:
The documents make clear that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac knew what they
were doing. Their own risk managers raised warning after warning about the
dangers of investing heavily in the subprime and alternative mortgage market,
but these warnings were ignored.
In a presentation given in 2007, Fannie Mae's management told the board:
'We want to go down the credit spectrum.... Subprime spreads have wid-
ened dramatically to their widest level in years. We do not feel there is much
risk going down to AA and A. We don't expect to take losses at AA and A level.
Eventually, we want to go to BBB. We want to move quickly while the opportu-
nity is still [t]here...
Taking these risks proved tremendously lucrative for Fannie and Freddie's
CEOs. They made over $40 million between 2003 and 2007. But their irre-
sponsible decisions are now costing the taxpayers billions of dollars. ,148
Like many others on Wall Street, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took on excessive
long-term risks to enhance short-term profits and are now paying the price. 149 Also,
like many on Wall Street, regulators were ill-equipped to oversee the GSEs and
require them to avoid riskier business lines. °
Shortly before the explosion of the subprime mortgage markets in 2001, Con-
gress slashed the budget for Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
and moderate-income housing for creating the financial crisis but the facts do not support these claims); James
R. Hagerty, The Financial Crisis: Bailout Politics: Fannie, Freddie Share Spotlight in Mortgage Mess-Govern-
ment-Backed Mortgage Giants Are Targets in Political Debate Over What Sparked the Housing Bust, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 16, 2008, at A6 [hereinafter Hagerty, Financial Crisis].
146. STRATEGIC CROSSROADS, supra note 143, at 25.
147. See id. at 5-11.
148. The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 4-6 (2008) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20090209155117.pdf.
149. See Krugman, supra note 144; Hagerty, Financial Crisis, supra note 145 (noting the significant losses
faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
150. See Jack Guttentag, Loan Regulation Probably Wouldn't Have Prevented This Crisis, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 2008, at F9 (noting that because the economic structure was changing, previously relied upon statistics and
experience were rendered irrelevant, thereby leaving the regulators unable to anticipate and react to the crisis).
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(OFHEO), the regulator that oversaw Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by nearly
18%.151
The GSEs, however, remain critical providers of mortgage finance in this coun-
try. 2 Despite a brief period from 2003 through 2006 when private-label securitiza-
tions became the primary source of mortgage financing, the GSEs remain the
largest financiers of U.S. residential mortgages. 5 3 As of December 31, 2007, the
GSEs held more than 45% of the total outstanding mortgage debt in the U.S. 4 The
GSEs' importance as providers of capital to the mortgage markets is even more
important in times of economic stress. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently fi-
nance 75% of new mortgages. 5
E. The Explosion of Subprime Lending
This long-term decline in the regulation of the mortgage industry, and in particu-
lar, the boom in unregulated non-GSE financed lending after 2001, set the stage for
an explosion of high cost, exotic mortgage products offered to subprime borrow-
ers.5 6 In 2001, subprime lending represented 7.2% of mortgage originations but
exploded over the next five years until they reached 20% of mortgage originations
in 2006.' 57 The breakdown of subprime mortgage by type illustrates the prevalence
151. Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Regulator Appeals to
House Appropriations Committee for Full Budget (June 5, 2000) (available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/
archive/docs/press/PRApprops_6_5_00.pdf).
152. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Views Diverge on How to Recast Fannie, Freddie, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2008, at
DOI ("Fannie, Freddie and government agencies are funding nearly all of the nation's home loans."); see also
Stephen Labaton, All Grown Up and, Some Say, Unneeded, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at 4 (discussing the GSEs
roles in mortgage finance and critics' concerns about their structures).
153. See Jody Shenn & James Tyson, Fannie, Freddie May Enrich Shareholders in Subprime's Shakeout,
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 5, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=axfeEvVeLwww&
refer=news ("Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lost market share starting in 2002 as the housing boom began and
the companies became mired in accounting scandals."); Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1082-83 (2007).
154. See FREDDIE MAC, INFORMATION STATEMENT AND ANNUAL REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS 2 ("At Decem-
ber 31, 2007, our total mortgage portfolio, which includes our retained portfolio and credit guarantee portfo-
lio, was $2.1 trillion, while the total U.S. residential mortgage debt outstanding, which includes single-family
and multifamily loans, was approximately $11.8 trillion."); FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N, QUARTERLY REPORT
(Form 10-Q), at 10 (Mar. 31, 2008) (stating that as of December 31, 2007, Fannie Mae had $2.9 trillion in total
mortgage credit outstanding, or approximately 24.5%.); GINNIE MAE, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 7 ("The in-
crease in FHA loan volume and demand for highly secure, liquid securities has helped to boost issuance of
Ginnie Mae MBS and subsequently, Ginnie Mae's outstanding portfolio. Issuance increased 4.3 percent during
FY 2007 with an ending outstanding portfolio balance of $427.6 billion, up from $410 billion in FY 2006.").
155. The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 11 th Cong. (2008) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski), available at http://
oversight.house.gov/documents/20081209115538.pdf.
156. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 108, at 272 (analyzing responses to the subprime mortgage crisis by look-
ing at its causes, including government deregulation that led to innovations in mortgage products).
157. See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111 th Cong. 11, at 29 (2008) (testimony of Eric Stein, Senior
Vice President, Center for Responsible Lending) (documenting subprime loans as 7.2% of the market of mort-
gage originations in 2001, and 20.1% of the market in 2006).
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of risky mortgages being offered to less creditworthy borrowers: only 16% were
fixed-rate mortgages, 40% were 30-year ARMs, 17% were interest-only loans, 19%
were 40-year ARMs, and 8% were balloon loans.' In addition, between 2000 and
2005, the number of subprime loans made without full documentation of the bor-
rowers' income, assets or employment climbed from 26% of subprime mortgages
in 2000 and by 2005 the portion had grown to 44%."9
Subprime mortgages were targeted at communities of color. 6 ° At the height of
the subprime lending activity in 2006, white borrowers took on 71% of new mort-
gages and 56% of all subprime mortgages, African-American borrowers were re-
sponsible for 10% of new mortgage originations and 19% of new subprime
mortgages and Hispanic people represented 14% of new borrowers and 20% of
new subprime mortgage originations. 6'
F. The Community Reinvestment Act and the Subprime Bubble
For nearly 50 years, the dual system of federal financing and state regulation of
residential home mortgage markets remained in place and was relatively successful
in providing access to capital and protecting borrowers from abusive lending prac-
tices.'62 However, this system was less than successful in providing mortgage fi-
nancing to urban homeowners and to racial minorities.'63 The effort to address this
pattern of the withholding of credit from communities of color, referred to as "red-
158. Id. at 11.
159. Id.
160. Brescia, supra note 108, at 272; Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the
Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1509-10 (2008) (citing the marketing of predatory lenders toward groups
they perceive as financially unsophisticated, including low-income and minority borrowers, as an additional
abuse).
161. Bob Tedeschi, Subprime Loans' Wide Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at RE10.
Whites made up 71 percent of the borrower population in 2006 and received 56 percent of the
subprime loans originated that year. Blacks, meanwhile, made up 10 percent of the loan pool, yet
received 19 percent of the subprime loans. Hispanics constituted 14 percent of the borrower commu-
nity and received 20 percent of the subprime loans.
Id.
162. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms for Regulating Consumer Credit,
73 TENN. L. REV. 303, 307-16 (2006) (discussing the development of current mortgage law as a balance be-
tween state regulation to protect borrowers from lenders with more bargaining power and knowledge and
federal deregulation to increase access to credit); Rayth T. Myers, Comment, Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan
Crisis: Why Current Regulations are Flawed and What is Needed to Stop Another Crisis From Occurring, 87 OR. L.
REV. 311, 317-18 (2008) (discussing the securitization of mortgage loans in recent years and its role in the
increase in subprime lending and the decrease in the effectiveness of previous state regulations).
163. See generally Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship:
A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 n. 11(2005) (dis-
cussing the targeting of potential borrowers based on demographic data); Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging
the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69
TUL. L. REV. 373, 388-89 (1995) ("Those most often affected [by predatory lenders] are minorities, the elderly,
and the inner-city and rural poor.").
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
THE LEGACY OF DEREGULATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
lining," was one area of increased consumer protection in the mortgage markets
during the period after 1975."
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977, requiring
insured commercial banks and thrifts "to demonstrate that their deposit facilities
serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to
do business." '65 These needs include access to credit and personal banking ser-
vices.'66 CRA required financial institutions' federal regulators to, as part of peri-
odic examinations, "assess the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its
entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consis-
tent with the safe and sound operation of such institution."'6 7 The assessment must
be considered by the regulator as part of the determination whether to authorize an
institution's application to open a new branch.'68 CRA did not create quotas requir-
ing financial institutions to provide services to underserved communities but, in-
stead, created incentives to do so.'69
Enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act intensified in the 1990s under
the Clinton administration. 70 In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) added
a provision that prohibited banks that did not comply with the diversity standards
imposed by the Federal Reserve under CRA from converting from bank holding
companies into financial holding companies. 7 ' As discussed in more detail below,
in order for banking holding companies to take advantage of the ability under
164. Wilson, supra note 163, at 1487 (explaining that the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 was used to
address "the problem of 'redlining' by encouraging lenders to make capital available throughout the lender's
community rather than concentrating loans only in 'desirable' locations").
165. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (2006).
166. Id. § 2901(a)(2).
167. Id. § 2903(a)(1).
168. Id. § 2903(a)(2).
169. Thomas W. Beetham, Note, The Community Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks: Redefining the Com-
munity, 39 B.C. L. REV. 911, 915 (1998) (stating that Congress attempted to balance the bank's obligation to
ensure community access with its need for independence to select profitable investment opportunities through
the CRA by not requiring banks to meet quotas, instead encouraging them to consider all income groups in the
region).
The CRA emphasizes that banking institutions fulfill their CRA obligations within the framework of
safe and sound operation. Although CRA performance evaluations have become more quantitative
since regulatory changes in 1995, stressing actual performance rather than documented efforts to
serve their community's credit needs, the CRA does not stipulate minimum targets or even goals for
lending, service or investments. At the same time it is fair to say that the primary focus of the CRA
evaluations is the number and dollar amount of lending to lower-income borrowers or areas. How-
ever, the agencies instruct examiners to determine an institution's capacity to extend credit to lower-
income groups and assess local economic and market conditions that might affect the income and
geographic distribution of their lending and to judge their performance in this context.
Memorandum from Glenn Canner & Neil Bhutta, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Div. of Research
and Statistics, to Sandra Braunstein, Dir., Consumer & Community Affairs Div. 2 (Nov. 21, 2008) (available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/20081203-analysis.pdf).
170. William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 377, 400
(stating that the Community Reinvestment Act was strengthened by new regulations in 1995 and the Clinton
administration's Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1994).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(2) (2006).
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GLBA to engage in non-banking financial activities including insurance or securi-
ties underwriting they were required to convert to financial holding companies by
registering with the Federal Reserve.'
Some have argued that the Community Reinvestment Act was a major contribu-
tor to the mortgage crisis because it compelled loans to persons with poor credit
histories."' However, according to Randall Kroszner, Federal Reserve Board
Governor,
[Situdies [prepared by the Fed for Congress] found that lending to lower-in-
come individuals and communities has been nearly as profitable and per-
formed similarly to other types of lending done by CRA-covered institutions.
Thus, the long-term evidence shows that the CRA has not pushed banks into
extending loans that perform out of line with their traditional businesses.
Rather, the law has encouraged banks to be aware of lending opportunities in
all segments of their local communities as well as to learn how to undertake
such lending in a safe and sound manner.'74
Even more pertinently, the vast majority of risky subprime loans that are the
focus of the crisis were underwritten between 2004 and 2007, more than ten years
after the CRA was strengthened in 1995 and more than five years after the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley provisions governing bank holding company conversions.'75
Finally, non-bank lending institutions, such as mortgage brokers, are not cov-
ered by CRA.'76 When the subprime mortgage originations peaked in 2006, only
6% of these mortgages were made by institutions covered by CRA.'77 A study by
Federal Reserve researchers concluded that "[t] aken together, the available evidence
to date does not lend support to the argument that the CRA is a root cause of the
subprime crisis."'
172. Id. § 1843(l)(1).
173. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: When Even Good News Worsens a Panic, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2008, at A17 (alleging Congress' policies of making mortgages too available proximately caused the
credit collapse); Martin Samchalk, Letter to the Editor, Bad Apples are Bad in Any Package, WALL ST. I., Oct. 13,
2008, at A18 (stating that the CRA "forced bad lending practices on our economy").
174. Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve Board, Remarks at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty
Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008) (available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/lkroszner2008l203a.htm).
175. Memorandum from Canner & Bhutta, supra note 169, at 2.
176. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902 (2006); see also Memorandum from Canner & Bhutta, supra note 169, at 7, for a
comparison between the role of CRA covered entities and independent mortgage companies in subprime lend-
ing at its peak.
177. Memorandum from Canner & Bhutta, supra note 169, at 3 (citing that 2006 Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act data indicated only 6% of all subprime loans in 2006 were made by CRA-covered institutions to
lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods).
178. See id. at 6. The Federal Reserve used "higher-priced loans" as a proxy for subprime mortgages. Id.
at 3.
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G. Conclusions
Deregulation was offered as a solution to the strains placed on regulated mortgage
markets by instability in the larger financial system in the 1970s. Despite efforts to
rebuild the regulatory system surrounding the mortgage finance system through
FIRREA after the S&L crisis, it is clear that the long-run trend since the 1970s has
been to weaken mortgage regulation. This long-term weakening accelerated dra-
matically after 2003 in an environment of very cheap credit and a federal govern-
ment uninterested in consumer protection regulation. For a time, the mortgage
bubble that resulted substituted for a healthy labor market as a source of increasing
aggregate demand in the U.S. economy. 179 However, mortgage markets did not ex-
ist during this period in isolation. Mortgage markets grew at an enormous pace due
to their being able to access capital flows available due to a broader deregulatory
trend in the capital markets writ large.' But that very deregulatory trend had in it
the seeds of a further crisis of opacity that returned to haunt both the mortgage
markets and the larger economy in the crisis of 2007-08.'
III. FINANCIAL MARKET DEREGULATION AND THE CREATION
OF THE SHADOW FINANCIAL SYSTEM
A. Early Stages of Deregulation
Deregulation affected nearly all areas of the financial markets during the period
from the 1980's through 200882 While it is outside the scope of this article to
discuss all areas of deregulation, several areas particularly facilitated the flow of
funds into mortgage-related assets and led to opacity throughout the financial
system."'
The histories of the weakening of mortgage regulation and the emergence of the
shadow financial system begin at the same point-with the passage of DIDMCA,
whose mortgage-related implications were discussed above. DIDMCA established
179. See 155 CONG. REc. H512 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kucinich) ("As wages were
stagnant, the Fed intentionally created the housing bubble to lure people on to debt treadmills to keep the
economy afloat. Americans own less and less of their homes. And the belief that asset inflation separate from
wages is real wealth is ludicrous.").
180. Id.
181. William Pfaff, Market Speculation Fuels Inflation, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 2008, at 4A ("[l1n
important respects, deregulation and globalization have undermined valid markets. To function, a real market
depends on reliable information, and among the characteristics of recent developments have been a multiplica-
tion of derivatives and a practice of 'securitization' that have greatly increased the opacity of markets.").
182. For a comprehensive discussion of deregulation from 1975 through 2000, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 215.
183. Id.
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the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee to phase out interest rate con-
trols on non-checking account bank deposits over a six-year period.'
The purposes of DIDMCA included making the cost of capital more equal
among depository institutions, leveling the playing field among bank and non-
bank financial services providers and allowing consumers access to higher interest
savings, and improving public access to financial services and encouraging compe-
tition among financial services providers.' One of the deregulatory measures used
to accomplish this was the removal of caps on interest rates banks could pay on
deposits." 6
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a marked flow of funds away
from checking and savings accounts, traditionally the only FDIC-insured accounts,
and into riskier, higher yielding parts of the financial markets. 7 This began with
the rapid rise of interest rates in the 1970s when individuals began moving their
savings into higher yielding money market mutual funds.' 8
Traditionally, banks have served as the providers of capital for companies that
could not access the public equity and debt markets. 9 The commercial paper mar-
ket, however, began to erode banks' prevalence in the corporate loan market in the
1970s. 1"° From 1970 to 1995 the commercial paper market grew from one-twenti-
eth the size of the commercial bank loan market to one-fifth of the size.' 9'
184. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 § 204, 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (expired in 1986). Section
204 authorized a phase-out of rate limitations and a gradual maximum rate increase. Id. Sections which imple-
mented the Depository Institutions Deregulations Committee expired in 1986. Id. §§ 3501-3509.
185. Elijah Brewer III, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980: Landmark




187. Wilmarth, supra note 182, at 239-41.
188. Id. at 239.
189. Id. at 227-28.
190. Id. at 231.
191. Id. (citing Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications
for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, FED. RES. BANK OP N.Y., ECON. POL'Y REV., July 1995, at 27, 31).
The preference for nonbank lending was also visible in the growth of the junk-bond markets in the late 1980s
and, again, in the period from 2002-2007. Id. at 231-32; see Tim Weithers, Credit Derivatives, Macro Risks, and
Systemic Risks, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA, ECON. REV., Oct. 2007, at 43, 51 (stating that record low default
rates from 2005-2006 encouraged investment in junk bonds); see also Tom Petruno, Investing: Trashed Junk
Bonds Making a Comeback, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at 1 (stating that default rates of junk bonds were at a
two decade low following a record high in 2002). By the late 1980s, around 20% or $200 billion of all corporate
debt issuances were below investment grade. Wilmarth, supra note 182, at 232 (citing Lawrence M. Benveniste
et al., The Failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Evidence on the Implications for Commercial Banks, 3 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 104, 107 (1993)). New issues and outstanding junk bonds contracted after the leveraged
buyout bust in the late 1980s and then started to grow again in conjunction with the tech bubble of the late
1990s and reached $600 billion in outstanding junk bonds in April 2000. Id. Consumer lending exhibited a
similar move away from regulated banking institutions and by 2004, 54% of household debt was held by
nonbank lenders, including 39% by nonbank mortgage or real estate lenders. Id. at 238.
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When interest rates began to rise in the late 1970s and early 1980s, depositors
took money out of savings accounts and invested in money market funds, which
are mutual funds that invest in short-term bonds and provide significant liquidity
to investors.1 92 Investors viewed money market funds as a high-yield alternative to a
savings account.'93
B. Securitization
Securitization was pioneered by Freddie Mac as a way to increase capital available
to finance fixed rate mortgages in the secondary market and provide investors with
a moderate-yield, home mortgage backed bond.1 94 It later became the tool utilized
by lending institutions to access seemingly limitless amounts of capital to finance
loans that were too risky for regulated institutions to hold on their balance
sheets.""
The GSEs pioneered securitization as a means of improving liquidity of mort-
gage assets and increasing the flow of capital into the markets. Until 1984, however,
private financiers were largely prevented from purchasing or owning mortgage-
related securities.'96 Congress passed the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement
Act of 1984 (SMMEA) to allow private financial institutions to invest in MBS.' 97
SMMEA included provisions that preempted state laws that would have prevented
state regulated banks from investing in privately issued MBS and prohibiting states
from regulating private MBS issuances.' 98 This set the stage for a dramatic increase
in both the supply and demand for securitized debt. In the mid-1980s, private
issuers began securitizing non-mortgage assets to create securities backed by car
loans, credit card receivables, corporate loans and other types of assets.'99
Most securitizations meet the definition of an "investment company" under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and would be regulated like mutual funds if they
did not find ways to operate under exceptions to the Act.2"' The Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 (" 1940 Act") was enacted to address the differences between direct
192. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A
HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 506 (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS] (ex-
plaining how the SEC facilitated the growth of money market funds through the passage of exemptive orders in
the 1970s that allowed them circumvent valuation requirements that traditional investment companies, such as
mutual funds, must fulfill).
193. Wilmarth, supra note 182, at 239-41.
194. Engel & McCoy, supra note 136, at 1273-74.
195. Id.
196. See generally PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 192, at 9 (noting that Congress passed the Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 "to expand the participation of the private sector" in the secondary
mortgage-backed securities market).
197. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1).
198. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 192, at 9-10.
199. See id. at 11-13.
200. See id. at 66-68.
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investments in public companies and participation in pooled investment vehicles."'
The 1940 Act requires that these pooled investment vehicles be subject to enhanced
regulation." 2
In order to facilitate the issuance of securitized debt, the SEC issued a rule in
connection with SMMEA that relaxed the registration requirements applicable to
these issuances, generically called asset-backed securities (ABS).20 3 In 1992, the SEC
expanded its 1984 rulemaking and relaxed registration requirements for non-mort-
gage ABS and exempted many ABS transactions from 1940 Act registration.0 4 ABS
are also exempt from anti-fraud provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that require chief
executive officers and chief financial officers of public companies to file attestations
with the commission certifying the accuracy of their financial reports." 5 The Com-
mission also issued no-action letters exempting large portions of the securitization
market from registration requirements and issued a rule in 2005 codifying these
decisions. 206
The market for securitized debt stimulated the U.S. bond market to nearly
double in the last eight years, from $17.20 trillion at the end of 2000 to $33.18
201. See After Blackstone: Should Small Investors be Exposed to Risks of Hedge Funds?: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, Comm. on Oversight, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Joseph Borg, President of
the Board of Directors of the North American Securities Administrators Association).
202. See id.
203. SEC Shelf Registration Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2008).
204. See generally Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-6964, 34-31345, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (Oct. 29, 1992) (adopting amendments to substantially
simplify the securities registration process).
205. See generally Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 22-8238, Exchange Act Release No.
47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, Sarbanes-Oxley Act File No. S7-40-02, 68 Fed. Reg.
36,636 (June 18, 2003) (adopting reporting requirement rules pursuant to Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002 concerning management's report on the company's internal control over financial reporting).
206. Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 8518, Exchange Act No. 50,905, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
File No. S7-21-04, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506 (Jan. 7, 2005).
[W]e recognize that securitization is playing an increasingly important role in the evolution of the
fixed income financial markets. Our staff has attempted to accommodate the different nature of ABS
and evolving business practices, while reducing unnecessary or impractical compliance burdens,
through its numerous no-action and interpretive positions. However, the accumulated informal gui-
dance, while helpful to some ABS transactions, has diminished the transparency of applicable re-
quirements because an ABS registrant or investor seeking to understand the applicable requirements
must review and assimilate a large body of no-action letters and other staff positions. This time-
consuming practice decreases efficiency and transparency and leads to uncertainty and common
problems. Even before we issued the proposals, many issuers, investors and other market participants
had requested a defined set of regulatory requirements for guidance. Commenters on the proposals
expressed universal support for a separate framework for the registration and reporting of ABS. Staff
reviews of filings provide further evidence that many compliance issues may be mitigated and poten-
tial issues avoided through clearer and more transparent regulatory requirements. Recent market
events involving distressed transactions also have highlighted the need for improved disclosures as
well as a renewed attention on servicing practices.
Id.
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trillion in the third quarter of 2008.207 The types of debt pooled and sold to inves-
tors has expanded to include auto loans, credit card receivables, student loans,
commercial real estate loans, and corporate loans.s While growth in the debt mar-
kets between 2000 and 2008 was led by mortgage-related debt, which exploded by
more than 250% during this period, corporate debt was not far behind, having
grown 182%.2"9
Securitization of loans to companies purchased in leveraged buyouts provided
the necessary capital to finance a boom in leveraged buyouts that coincided roughly
with the boom in the subprime mortgage market.210 U.S. and European leveraged
buyout funds, or "private equity", raised $250 billion in 2005 alone, five times LBO
fund raising 10 years earlier.21' According to some estimates, in 2006 new LBO
transactions valued at around $500 billion were completed. 12
As securitization evolved to include riskier types of loans, the structure of securi-
tizations changed with the intent of continuing to provide highly rated securities
that institutional investors, especially money market funds and pension funds,
would purchase as well as riskier, higher yielding securities to appeal to investors
with more appetite for risk.2 3 This was accomplished by creating multi-tiered capi-
tal structures so that investors that owned interests in different tiers of the structure
had different rights to cash flows generated by the pool. In most circumstances, this
207. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass'n, Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, http://
www.sifma.org/research/pdf/OverallOutstanding.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
208. See Maria Chan, US Worries May Slow Banks' Profit Growth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 31, 2008,
at 4 ("Collateralised debt obligations are pools of mortgages, corporate loans or commercial and property loans
sliced into bonds with varying credit ratings and maturities."); see also Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons,
Why a U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis Is Felt Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at Cl (stating that
banks sell asset-backed securities comprised of pooled mortgages, student loans, auto loans, credit card receiv-
ables, and other income-producing assets).
209. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Ass'n, supra note 207.
210. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. Sys., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND LEVERAGED
FINANCE MARKETS 1 (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs30.pdf.
The amount of leveraged loans and highyield bonds outstanding tripled between 1999 and 2007. A
large part of leveraged debt issuance has been used to finance leveraged buyout (LBO) deals, which
are dominated by private equity transactions. Favourable global economic and financial market con-
ditions, high investor risk appetite and financial innovation were important drivers of rapid market
growth.
Id.
211. JEAN HELWEGE & FRANK PACKER, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PRIVATE MATTERS 1 (2008), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work266.pdf.
212. Id.
213. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. Sys., supra note 210, at 1.
The landscape of the leveraged finance market has changed substantially in the current decade.
Leveraged loan issuance has grown much more rapidly in recent years than issuance of high-yield
bonds. At the same time, institutional investors have replaced banks as the main investors. Several
related developments have contributed to these shifts in market structure: the emergence of collater-
alised loan obligation (CLO) vehicles as loan securitisers and intermediaries; growing ratings cover-
age of loans, which attracted institutional investors; increased secondary market trading of leveraged
loans; and a shift in bank business models from "buy and hold" to "originate to distribute" (OTD).
Id.
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meant that the highest level or tranche had the senior-most interest in the pool and
was paid the lowest interest rate and the junior-most interest holder was paid the
highest interest rate."'
The end result was that investors owned varying interests in diverse pools of
corporate and personal loans that made it difficult, if not impossible, for even the
most sophisticated investors to perform proper due diligence."' Rating agencies
claimed to provide the due diligence necessary to give investors comfort that the
securities were safe and secure and the ratings allowed investors, chasing higher
yielding assets for their money market funds or pension funds, to buy trillions of
dollars of the senior-most tranches of these securities.216
C. Shadow Financial Markets
In order for financiers to continue to sell these securities en masse there had to be a
market for the most junior tranches." 7 Hedge funds-opaque and unregulated in-
vestment pools only saleable to wealthy investors-provided this market."'
One of the ways that owners of more junior interests in securitized debt attempt
to shield themselves from the risk that the borrowers whose loans are held in the
securitized pool will default is through the purchase of unregulated insurance con-
tracts called "credit default swaps" (CDS) 19 According to data from Bank of
America published in March 2007, banks and brokers are the largest participants in
the CDS market, accounting for 33% of buyers and 39% of sellers.2 0 Hedge funds
214. See Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of Ratings, BIS Q.
REV., June 2005, at 69, 76, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/ri-qt0506.htm (noting that under prior-
ity ordering, credit support "means the most senior claims are expected to be insulated" from most "default risk
of the asset pool"). See generally id. at 67-78 (discussing the risk properties of structured finance instruments
and the underlying asset pools).
215. MARGUERITTE HARLOW, A REVIEW OF THE MONGOLIAN PRIMARY MORTGAGE MARKET 12-13 (2007)
(noting that the "more heterogenous the terms and documentation is of a portfolio of loans, the greater the
cost of due diligence").
216. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Financial Services 110th
Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of J. Kyle Bass, Managing Partner, Hayman Capital) (explaining that NRSROs have
become "de facto regulatory bodies," particularly in relation to money market funds and pension funds due to
legal requirements that require them to invest in bonds that the NRSROs have given high ratings).
217. Committee on the Global Financial System, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets 26-31 (Bank
for Int'l. Settlements, CGFS Working Group Paper No. 30, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
cgfs3o.pdf~noframes= 1.
218. Id. at 27. See Appendix G, infra, for the investor share of securitization products.
219. Bruce E. Kayle, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Credit Derivative Transactions, in TAx STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS &
RESTRUCTURINGS 2007, at 573, 579-80 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning, Course Handbook Series No. 792,
2007) (providing a detailed explanation of credit default swaps).
220. Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 5 (Bank for Int'l
Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.pdfnoframes=l.
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are the second most active participants and account for an estimated 31% of CDS
purchasers and 28% of CDS sellers.22'
Until Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in
2000, CDS and other derivatives contracts were subject to the Commodities Ex-
change Act and regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. 2
CFMA, however, removed CDS from regulaters' purview, allowing the market to
grow to as large as $58 trillion by some estimates. 223 The CDS markets became the
unseen glue that linked the world's financial institutions to one another and, ac-
cording to some reports it was Bear Stearns' activities in the CDS markets that led
regulators to believe it was too interconnected to fail.224
All of these factors have contributed to the creation of a huge system of lending,
borrowing, securities underwriting, and insurance underwriting that exists com-
pletely outside the purview of regulators. 225 The lending, mostly done by unregu-
lated mortgage brokers, the borrowers themselves, the pooling, the entities that
bought these assets, and the insurers are, to a large extent, opaque. 22' Neither regu-
lators nor the public have access to sufficient information to assess the risk within
these assets or counterparty exposure arising from participating in these opaque
markets.227
Leveraged buyout funds, largely unregulated pooled investment vehicles that buy
operating companies using small amounts of equity and large amounts of debt,
have become a large source of securitized debt.228 The value of outstanding LBO
loans is probably much higher than the value of outstanding subprime mortgages,
which was $1.3 trillion in 2007, because banks and other lenders provided $1.1
221. Id.
222. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (explaining
that the purpose of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 is to eliminate certain regulations for
commodity futures exchanges and streamline the legal framework for trading in futures and derivatives).
223. Testimony Concerning Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored
Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1-2 (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/tsO92308cc.htm (remarking that the credit default swap market is an unreg-
ulated $58 trillion market which is completely opaque).
224. The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Ben
S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/bernanke2008O4O2a.htm. "Our financial system is extremely complex and intercon-
nected, and Bear Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets .... Given the current excep-
tional pressures on the global economy and financial system, the damage caused by a default by Bear Stearns
could have been severe and extremely difficult to contain. Moreover, the adverse effects would not have been
confined to the financial system but would have been felt broadly in the real economy through its effects on
asset values and credit availability." Id. at 2-3.
225. See Paul McCulley, Teton Reflections, PIMCO: GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK Focus, Aug./Sept. 2007, http://
www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/FF/2007/GCBF+August-+September+2007.htm.
226. Nouriel Roubini, The Rising Risk of a Systemic Financial Meltdown: The Twelve Steps to Financial Disas-
ter, RGE MONITOR, Feb. 5, 2008, http://media.rgemonitor.com/papers/0/12stepsNR.
227. Id.
228. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE EQUITY: RECENT GROWTH IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
ExPOSED RISKS THAT WARRANT CONTINUED ATTENTION 7, 10 (2008).
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trillion in debt financing for LBOs between 2005 and 2007 alone.229 Despite their
size, neither companies owned by LBO funds nor their investors are subject to any
oversight.23 When a public company is purchased in a leveraged buyout, it is taken
private and generally stops filing regular reports with the SEC that are required of
public companies by the securities laws."'
Leveraged buyout funds and hedge funds, like ABS issuing entities, meet the
definition of investment companies under the 1940 Act.232 Hedge funds and private
equity funds are private investment companies that are exempt from regulation as
investment companies under section 3(c)(1) of the Act, which exempt funds that
are not sold to the general public and have fewer than 100 shareholders, or section
3(c)(7) because they are not sold to the general public and their shareholders meet
certain requirements. 233 The interests hedge funds and private equity funds sell to
investors are generally exempt from registration, and offered as private placements
under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933.3 This means that hedge funds
and private equity funds do not provide transparency to regulators or investors in
229. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (testimony
of Emory W. Rushton, Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief National Bank Examiner, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency).
230. See Gregory J. Schwartz, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholder and Enhance
the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 489, 492-93 (1986) (explaining that neither state common law nor
federal securities law have developed to the extent necessary to adequately and fairly regulate LBOs in the
emerging shadow markets, which, in turn, causes a situation where there is a risk of the so-called "control
group" of the leveraged company focusing on personal interests rather than the interests of all shareholders
with little oversight in their path).
231. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-I (2006).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1). An investment company is any issuer which:
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business
of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the install-
ment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding; or
(C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or
trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash
items) on an unconsolidated basis.
Id.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) & (7). In 2004 the SEC passed a rule requiring hedge fund managers to
register under the Investment Advisers Act. The rule would have given the SEC limited authority to oversee the
activities of most hedge fund investment managers. See Registration of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Invest-
ment Advisers Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279
(2006)). The rule was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit Court in 2006. Goldstein v. S.E.C, 451 F.3d 873, 884
(D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Recent Cases, Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking-District of
Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission's "Hedge Fund Rule. '--Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d
873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 120 HARv. L. REv. 1394 (2007).
234. SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2008). Regulation D provides exemptions in which the
offer and sale of securities can be made without registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
because, among other requirements, the sale was made to an accredited investor in a private placement. See id.
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the way public companies or mutual funds do.23 These exemptions for hedge funds
and private equity funds meant that some of the largest issuers of debt that was
pooled and sold to investors and some of the largest purchasers of this debt were
completely outside of regulators' purview.
D. The End of Glass-Steagall
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve had begun chipping away at the Glass-Steagall Act's
separation of banking and securities activities in 1987.236 Over 10 years, the Fed
issued a series of regulations that allowed bank subsidiaries to underwrite and deal
corporate debt and equity securities.237 In 1987, bank subsidiaries were limited to
transactions in commercial paper and a small range of securities as long as these
activities did not account for more than 5% of the subsidiary's gross revenues.23 By
1997, however, the Fed had broadened the types of securities transactions that
could be undertaken by bank subsidiaries, the revenue limit was increased to 25%
of the subsidiaries' gross revenues and rules had been lifted that barred banks from
marketing the securities services provided by their subsidiaries. 239 This allowed reg-
ulated commercial banks to enter the securitization markets in a substantial way
and also exposed regulated financial institutions to these unregulated loan pools. 24 °
The final nail in the coffin for the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition of providing
banking and securities services within a single entity came in 1998 when the Fed-
eral Reserve authorized the merger of Citicorp, a commercial bank, with Travelers
Group, Inc., an insurance company that had securities firm Salomon Smith Barney
as a subsidiary, to form Citigroup, the first universal bank in the U.S.24 Citigroup
has become the bank that has received the largest amount of TARP bailout funds
including $45 billion in preferred stock purchases and a $300 billion asset
12guarantee.
235. Roel C. Campos, Comm'r, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Hedge Fund Institutional
Forum Corporate Funds Roundtable (Mar. 5, 2007) (stating that hedge funds are not typically registered with
the SEC; therefore, the information available in the public domain regarding hedge funds is minimal).
236. Nicole Fradette et al., Regulatory Reform in Transition: The Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 545, 546, 552, 567-68 (1995) (explaining that the Federal Reserve along with the court system
acted in a manner which eventually caused the weakening of the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of commercial
and investment banking).
237. Wilmarth, supra note 182, at 319 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board's continued relaxation of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1996 through 1997 when the Board allowed section 20 subsidiaries to engage in securities
transactions so long as these transactions did not rise above 25% of the bank's gross revenues).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 319-20. The enlargement of the section 20 limits initiated a trend in which investment banks no
longer dominated the public offerings market as commercial banks continued to purchase section 20 subsidiar-
ies and expanded themselves into the securities market. Id.
241. Legal Developments, Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to Engage in
Nonbanking Activities, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 985 (1998) (describing an order by the Federal Reserve Board ap-
proving of the merger of Travelers Group, Inc. and Citicorp Insurance Company).
242. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
(Jan. 9, 2009).
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In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which repealed
restrictions on financial institutions' business operations that had been in place
since 1933 when Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act.243 Glass-Steagall was in-
tended to address conflicts of interest and systemic risk issues that arose from the
operation of commercial and investment banking within the same firm.244 GLBA
dismantled the barriers between commercial and investment banking, insurance,
and mortgage lending.245 Once commercial banks were permitted to enter the risk-
ier and more lucrative businesses previously reserved for investment banks, which
did not take FDIC-insured consumer deposits, bank holding companies shifted
away from consumer lending. As a result, unregulated mortgage brokers moved
into the home mortgage business. 46
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to survey the history of deregulation since 1970 in the
areas of labor markets, housing finance, and the broader capital markets. We have
sought to suggest how weakened labor market regulation creates an environment of
downward pressure on aggregate demand. In such an environment, where credit is
very cheap, asset-based lending becomes an attractive source of alternative con-
sumer demand. Such a strategy cannot work in a world of financial transparency
and comprehensive regulation of leverage and credit quality. 47 Thus another set of
pressures comes into being, pressures to create regulatory-free spaces where lever-
age can be incurred and real risks taken without the expensive backup of capital
reserves or the necessity of market actors telling anyone else what they are actually
doing. Of course, in a downturn, these shadow markets act as procyclical acceler-
ants to an economic downturn.
The challenge facing policymakers and regulators is how to rebuild an overall
system of economic regulation in a global context that can once again channel
capital to productive uses without the levels of volatility characteristic of recent
years.
243. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, § 101 (1999) (repealing §§ 20 & 32 of
the Glass-Steagall Act).
244. Anna Jackson Holly, Comment, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Protection of Consumers or Excuse to
Avoid Discovery?, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 615, 633-34 (2006). The Glass-Steagall Act was originally intended to
prevent commercial banks from engaging in securities transactions by maintaining a wall between commercial
banks and investment banks. Id. at 634.
245. See Pub L. No. 106-101, 113 Stat. 1341 (repealing the separation between commercial and investment
banks required by the Glass-Steagall Act).
246. Terry Carter, How Lawyers Enabled the Meltdown: And How They Might Have Prevented It, A.B.A. I.,
Jan. 2009, at 34, 35. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 not only affected commercial bank involvement in
the securities markets, it also caused commercial banks to move away from the home loan market in an effort
to further involve themselves in "mergers and acquisitions, retail brokering, and the underwriting of securities
based on subprime loans and collateralized debt obligations." Id. This left "home loan due diligence to largely
unregulated brokers[.]"Id. See Appendix H, infra, for the effect of regulation on the American financial system.
247. See Fannie Mae, Introduction, supra note 130, at 1.
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APPENDIX G-INVESTOR SHARE OF SECURITISATION PRODUCTS-'
INVESTOR SHARE OF SECURITISATION PRODUCTS IN 2007
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